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Chapter 1
Introduction
Any culture that requires that a decision be made within a group neces-
sarily creates methods for aggregating each individual’s preferences. For
instance, we see such a need in political elections, committees, and busi-
nesses. With the Internet and the increasing use of multiagent software
systems, the general need for means of aggregating differing preferences has
increased dramatically.
Voting is one way to come to a single option (or small group of options)
out of a larger pool of candidate options. Many voting systems exist, and
criteria exist (within the field of social choice theory) for deciding which
most fairly and accurately take into account the preferences of each voter.
Since there is generally much to be gained from influencing such a vote
through manipulation or bribery, one desirable criterion of fairness would
be whether such activities are impossible in the system. However, it has
been shown that a reasonable system that disallows manipulation does not
exist [18, 43], so the next-best solution would be a system in which deciding
how to bribe or otherwise influence the vote is so computationally difficult
as to render it impossible or highly unlikely.
While the debate over which voting systems are most fair and effective
is on record of existing over the past few centuries (and likely goes further
back to ancient Greece), there may exist the seeds of a renewal of this debate
in the current boom in voting due to new technologies. For one, in artificial
intelligence agents may vote to determine the best course of action to take
given the individual’s preferences. In addition, algorithms in search engines
and meta-search engines do order results in a manner that assumes a ranking
was somehow approached. Voting is not only on the rise in software, of
course, as most any user of the Internet could demonstrate. Internet users
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routinely vote most any user of the Internet could demonstrate. Internet
users routinely vote online in situations ranging from the inane (e.g., rating
a video on YouTube) to the potentially crucial (e.g., voting on whether a
story is newsworthy or not on any of a plethora of such sites, including Digg,
Reddit, and Newsvine).
These newer uses of voting systems are interesting. They are used in
environments where there are potentially far more candidates and voters
than are conventionally seen in, say, political elections. Also, in these new
environments, voting and manipulation can be automated to some degree,
thus making the possibility of manipulation and control even more real than
it has been in the past.
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra have proved for a num-
ber of voting systems that the bribery problem is too complex to be feasible
(i.e., NP-complete) [15], and much research has been put forth determining
the complexity of other problems related to voting.
But it is still possible in the optimization cases of these problems that
there exist approximation algorithms that can find a good solution with a
reasonable amount of computation. That is, while a voting system may seem
“resistant” to a particular form of manipulation as described by previous
research, it may be that the problem is not as difficult if we allow a constant
amount of error. Or, it may be that the problem is still difficult when error
is allowed, thus making the voting system even more resilient with respect
to some forms of manipulation. This thesis will examine the possibility of
such approximations for some problems in elections.
1.1 Overview
We will start with some background on traditional social choice theory, in-
cluding definitions of voting systems and criteria by which these systems
are judged (Chapter 2). This background along with a small amount of
computer science theory will be sufficient for the next chapter, Chapter 3,
which will sketch the current state of the field of computational social choice.
Some of the more relevant problems that are often studied under the um-
brella of elections and voting systems will be defined. In addition, the known
complexity of the problems will be summarized for some voting systems.
Next we will veer more towards theoretical computer science in Chap-
ter 4, an exploration of approximation algorithms. This chapter contains
the requisite definitions and concepts dealing with optimization problems
and their approximations. It will likely be most useful as a reference when
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later chapters mention an approximation concept, as opposed to being read
through on its own.
Once this background is covered, the chapters containing original results
begin.
First, we find some general approximation results on the problem of
bribery in voting systems inChapter 5. These proofs rely on the complexity
of manipulation problems for the same voting systems.
Next, we attempt to show the approximability of a specific bribery prob-
lem, known as plurality-weighted-$bribery. This takes part in a few chapters.
The first chapter regarding this problem is Chapter 6, which deals with
the knapsack problem, a classic and simply stated combinatorial problem.
This chapter will consist of a number of definitions as well as an overview of
some generalizations of the problem and approaches that have been taken
towards solving them. The motivation behind studying the knapsack prob-
lem is the potential relation between it and the bribery problem at hand
that could be exploited. The knapsack problem could also prove to be use-
ful regarding other problems in the realm of computational social choice,
and we hope that this chapter might draw some connections between the
two realms that have not been previously exploited.
Given this, in Chapter 7, we will take a look at the approximability of
the bribery problem plurality-weighted-$bribery. While we do not directly
prove approximability results for this problem, we do prove that a special
case of the problem is not approximable.
Finally, Chapter 8 contains an analysis of the approximation of some
control problems. For some problems we can prove that they are at least
partially resistant to being approximated, while other problems are far more
resistant.
1.2 Tips for Reading
A minimal knowledge of computational complexity theory will be assumed
throughout this work. An understanding of the complexity classes P and
NP as well as the concept of NP-completeness will be essential at points.
Any textbook regarding algorithms or complexity theory will likely have an
adequate review of these principles. Garey and Johnson’s canonical book
[17] can also provide this background.
Those who are already familiar with the background presented in Chap-
ters 2 through 4 will likely be more interested in the new results presented
in this thesis. These results are present in the latter chapters, specifically:
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• Sections 5.2 and 5.4 contain general results regarding the approxima-
bility of bribery,
• Sections 7.2 and 7.3 contain our results pertaining to bribery in elec-
tions using the plurality voting scheme, and
• Section 8.1 holds our non-trivial proofs of the nonapproximability of
control by adding candidates to plurality elections.
Some of the proofs (especially those in Chapter 8) are especially tedious.
It is advisable to read the proofs in Chapter 5 first, as those follow the same
pattern and are far simpler.
1.3 Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my advisor, Edith Hemaspaandra, for all of her guid-
ance and suggestions. Piotr Faliszewski was also extremely helpful, namely
by making a number of corrections and helping me clarify some points in
this thesis.
This research was supported in part by grant NSF-CCR 0311021.
Chapter 2
Social Choice Theory
Social choice theory is an area of research with close ties to political science
and economics that studies methods for selecting some options out of many
by aggregating the preferences of a number of people or agents. This might
include voting on a leader out of a number of candidates, deciding whether
a proposal should become law, or settling an argument over what to make
for lunch.
In particular, work in the area generally attempts to decide which voting
system is most fair for a particular task. In this capacity, the beginning of
social choice theory is usually dated as the late eighteenth century in France1,
when Borda and Condorcet had a disagreement over which voting system
should be used in the French Academy of Sciences [42]. Both parties in
the argument were mathematicians, and mathematics, including computer
science, has continued to be a strong force in the field since its inception.
As software has become more complex and pervasive, concepts from so-
cial choice have progressed beyond describing methods of collective decision
making in societies. Some computer systems also use these voting systems
in order to decide which course of action is best, much as societies do, and
this has contributed to an increased interest in the field.
2.1 Voting Systems
What follows is a discussion of some of the more well-known voting systems.
A voting system takes a set of voters with preferences over some set of
candidates and determines a set of winners. We will assume that preferences
1Although, recently, it has become clear that the theory has been studied as early as
the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries by Llull and Curanus[20]
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over candidates are strict, that is, a voter is not allowed to be indifferent
between two candidates, and we will represent a voter’s or a group of voters’
preferences by listing them in order of most- to least-preferred. For example,
a voter preferring candidate c to a to b would be represented by c > a > b.
An election, E, is then represented as a pair of sets, (C, V ), where C is
the set of candidates and V is the set of voters.
2.1.1 Scoring Protocols
Scoring protocols are generally straightforward: a list of points (often called
a scoring vector, α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm)) to be assigned to the candidates in
the election according to their position in each voter’s preferences is defined
by the protocol. That is, a voter has preferences c1 > c2 > . . . > cm, and
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m assigns αi points to candidate ci. Those candidates with the
most points win the election.
Example 2.1.1. Consider a scoring protocol over 3 candidates with scoring
vector (5, 4, 3). If these candidates are {c1, c2, c3} and a voter most prefers
c3, c1 next, and c2 least (i.e., c3 > c1 > c2), then the voter gives 5 points to
c3, 4 to c1, and 3 to c2.
plurality
Also known as simple majority or first-past-the-post, this is the most com-
mon voting system used in politics today. Part of its popularity is certainly
due to its simplicity: the candidate(s) with the largest number of votes is the
winner, where the candidate receives a vote whenever it is most preferred
by a voter.
Plurality is a family of scoring protocols with scoring vector (1, 0, . . . , 0),
that is, a voter’s most preferred voter gets a point, no other candidates get
any points from the voter. Due to the simplicity of the scoring vector, in
practical use one rarely thinks of plurality as a scoring protocol, but rather
of a vote that gives one point to the most-preferred candidate.
Borda count
Each voter’s most-desired candidate gets |C| − 1 points, the second most-
desired candidates get |C| − 2 points, etc., where |C| is the number of can-
didates in the election. More formally, the scoring vector is (|C| − 1, |C| −
2, . . . , 0).
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This method is appealing over plurality because voters are able to give
their opinions of all of the candidates (as opposed to just their favorite one)
and the degree of separation between candidates in a ranking is kept track
of (in addition to their ordering). For a more in-depth yet very accessible
discussion on the relative merits of Condorcet’s (below) and Borda’s counts,
see [42].
veto
A voter gives one point to each candidate except for the one it least prefers,
which gets zero points. That is, the scoring vector (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0) is applied
to each voter’s preferences.
2.1.2 Other Voting Systems
While scoring protocols are among the simplest useful voting systems to
define, there are many other voting systems, some of which are used in
practical settings. What follows is a mere sampling of these systems, some
of which are looked at in more depth in later chapters.
single transferable vote
Single transferable vote (STV) takes place in a number of rounds. During
each round, the candidate with the least votes (as judged in a plurality
election; ties are handled differently in separate versions) is eliminated, and
all voters who were voting for this candidate vote for their next preferred
candidate in the next round.
Example 2.1.2. Consider the election described by the following voters and
their preferences:
Voters With Preferences
4 x > y > z
3 z > y > x
2 y > z > x
First, y, with two points, would lose to both x and z, who get four and three
points, so y is eliminated. When y is removed from consideration, the two
voters who most prefer y vote instead for z. The easiest way to think about
this might be that when a candidate loses a round, it is entirely removed
from each voter’s preferences. Thus, z ends up with five points and beats x,
which still only has four points.
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If the election has more candidates, the process is identical, but there
are more rounds where candidates are eliminated until the desired number
of winners is found.
Single transferable vote is used in some regions from the local to federal
levels, perhaps most notably in Australia.
Condorcet voting
Under Condorcet voting, the candidate who strictly beats each other candi-
date in a pairwise contest wins overall.
Example 2.1.3. Say we had the following election:
Voters With Preferences
3 x > y > z
2 z > y > x
2 y > z > x
then, overall, the voters prefer y to x (four points to three), z to x (also four
points to three), and y to z (five points to two). Since y beats both x and
z (all of the other candidates) when it goes up against them individually, y
would be the Condorcet winner.
Such a criterion for a fair election seems a common-sense choice, however,
there will not always be a Condorcet winner due to cycles in preferences.
This is often called Condorcet’s Paradox.
Example 2.1.4. To see how the paradox appears, consider the following
election over three candidates, x, y, and z:
Voters With Preferences
3 x > y > z
3 y > z > x
3 z > x > y
There is no Condorcet winner in the above election. To see this, we first
compare candidates x and y, and we see that six voters prefer x and three
voters would rather y. Then, when comparing y and z, six voters prefer y
and three z. So far, it looks as though x should be the winner of the election
since it beat y between the two and y beat z. However, we have yet to compare
x and z, and, when we do, we are chagrined to find that six voters prefer z
and three x. That is, the group of voters has decided that its preferences are
x > y > z > x, which is irrational and leaves us with no better of an idea of
who should win the election.
2.1. VOTING SYSTEMS 15
Dodgson voting
Dodgson voting is an attempt to sidestep the Condorcet paradox by mak-
ing the candidate who is closest to being a Condorcet winner the winner.
Determining which candidate is the closest consists of counting the number
of switches that would need to be made in the voters’ preferences in order
to make the candidate a Condorcet winner. Then, the candidates who have
the smallest value for this number is the Dodgson winner.
A “switch” in this context is changing a voter’s preferences by flipping
two adjacent candidates in the preferences. For example, changing a voter’s
preferences from z > x > w > y to z > x > y > w would count as one
switch.
This voting system is named after its creator, the mathematician Charles
Dodgson, who is better known by his pseudonym Lewis Carroll.
approval voting
In this system, each voter gives a point to each candidate he or she approves
of, and a candidate with the highest number of points wins.
Example 2.1.5. There might be an election over candidates (v,w, x, y, z)
with the following voters:
Voters With Preferences
2 (1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
2 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0)
2 (0, 1, 0, 0, 1)
1 (0, 0, 1, 0, 1)
That is, there are two voter who vote with preferences (1, 0, 0, 1, 1), meaning
that they approve of candidates v, y, and z, but not w or x. Here z wins
with five points—five voters approve of candidate Z.
At times, k-approval voting, where a voter must approve of exactly k
candidates, or other situations, such as when k is half the number of candi-
dates, are examined.
maximin
This system assigns a score to candidate x by, in effect, holding plurality
elections with each other candidate in the election. The score of x is the
lowest score that it gets in any of these elections. The highest score is clearly
most desirable and determines the winner.
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2.2 Criteria in Social Choice Theory
Much research has been devoted to finding voting systems which are fair.
Generally, we consider a fair election to be one in which the will of the voters
is reasonably expressed. There are a number of criteria that a fair election
scheme could consist of, and here are a few concrete ones:
Pareto condition
A voting system satisfies the Pareto condition if, when candidate x is pre-
ferred by all voters over candidate y, candidate x will be preferred over
candidate y overall, as measured by the voting system. One modification of
this condition is to make it weak by saying that x must be strictly preferred
to y in each voter’s preferences (i.e., no indifference is allowed in preferences
between x and y). Similarly, the condition can be made strong by stipulat-
ing that only one voter need strictly prefer x to y, while the rest may find
x at least as good as y.
monotonicity
If a voting system never ranks a candidate lower because some voters rank
the candidate higher than before, the voting system is said to obey mono-
tonicity.
Many voting systems do obey this criterion. The voting systems that are
not monotone are often those which take place in rounds. One such voting
system is single transferable vote.
independence of irrelevant alternatives
This condition (in [2]) states that if candidate x is preferred over candidate y
overall, and one or more voters change their preferences regarding candidates
other than x and y, x should still be preferred to y overall.
While this condition seems to be a desirable one, many voting systems
do not obey it.
Example 2.2.1. Consider a Borda election like this:
Voters With Preferences
2 w > x > y > z
3 w > z > x > y
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Clearly, the voters prefer x over z with scores 7 and 6, respectively. However,
say we modify the preferences of both of the voters from the first set from
w > x > y > z to w > y > x > z. Now, even though the voters changed
their minds by promoting y, the overall preferences now favor z over x with
scores 6 and 5. Although y is not relevant to the relative rankings of x and z,
the ranking of y does have an effect on which of the two is preferred overall.
non-dictatorial
We should certainly expect a voting system to not give one voter the ability
to sway the outcome of the election. Otherwise, if a single voter ultimately
decides the outcome of an election, the scheme is dictatorial. That is, if some
voter, d, most prefers candidate x in an election and x wins no matter what
the rest of the voters prefer, then the voting system being used is dictatorial,
but if there is no such d, then the system is non-dictatorial.
2.3 Impossibility
Some of the work in social choice theory more relevant to this thesis includes
impossibility results, that is, proofs that particular properties cannot exist,
or that certain sets of properties cannot coexist, in voting systems.
2.3.1 Arrow’s Theorem
This theorem, which was discovered by the economist and Nobel Prize win-
ner Kenneth Arrow, attempts to determine whether a “fair” voting system
can exist. It states that a voting system over three or more candidates
cannot at the same time
• obey monotonicity,
• obey independence of irrelevant alternatives,
• ensure that any possibility out of the candidates could be selected, and
• be non-dictatorial,
all of which seem to be reasonable criteria for a “fair” voting system.
While the theorem does not necessarily imply that all voting systems
are worthless and broken, it does suggest that one of the above criteria will
have to be weakened for any non-dictatorial system.
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One formulation and proof of this is in [2], though it has since been made
stronger (e.g., by weakening some of the above conditions) and its proof has
been simplified [40].
2.3.2 Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
This theorem, found independently by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, is sim-
ilar to Arrow’s. It states [18, 43] that a voting system over three or more
preferences cannot at the same time
• ensure that any possibility out of the candidates could be selected,
• be immune to manipulation, and
• be non-dictatorial.
Manipulation in the context of voting systems occurs when a voter or
set of voters are better off not voting with their true preferences and, so,
choose to vote strategically in order to gain a better outcome. That is, the
manipulating voters will see a more preferred candidate win by voting with
preferences that differ from their actual ones. Certainly it is desirable to
use a voting system that is not manipulable, since a voting system does
not feel fair or effective if it does not make voters feel comfortable with
expressing their true preferences because other voters might be manipulating
the election.
In [40], Reny looks at the relationship between Arrow’s and the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem in more detail. In fact, the author uses what is
essentially the same, relatively simple proof to show both theorems hold.
As this theorem shows that manipulation will always be a possibility
when more than three candidates are involved in a reasonable voting sys-
tem, it motivates the current research into the computational complexity of
performing this manipulation and of computational social choice in general.
Such research can give us a better idea of how susceptible a system is to
manipulation (since we know that essentially all are susceptible) or some
related problem and in some ways this research can tell us which systems
are better than others.
With that, let us now turn to computational social choice, a field that
utilizes computational complexity theory to better determine vulnerabilities
which are exposed in social choice theory.
Chapter 3
Computational Social Choice
Whereas social choice theory is interested in the existence of voting systems
with particular properties (Chapter 2), computational politics, or computa-
tional social choice, is an attempt to determine the computational difficulty
of problems dealing with particular aspects of voting systems.
Similarly to social choice theory, a good deal of focus has been spent
on finding the complexity of performing possibly mischievous actions on an
election in a given voting system. The key difference is that computational
social choice can in some instances reveal that, while, yes, this form of
manipulation is possible in such-and-such voting system, finding the way to
do so is NP-complete and therefore can generally be considered intractable.
In this way, computational social choice can give us a better characterized
picture of which voting systems are vulnerable to certain bad occurrences.
In addition to these somewhat negative problems, effort has been put into
determining the complexity of certain positive problems, such as determining
the winner of an election or the scores of candidates in an election. Perhaps
surprisingly, for some voting systems these problems are rather difficult. In
fact, some are unlikely to be in NP1.
3.1 Definitions and Notation
Before we get into the definitions of the various problems to be considered,
we should define the notation to be used.
An election is a tuple (C, V ) over a set C of candidates and a multiset
V of voters. Each v ∈ V has a list of preferences over all candidates in C,
1See, for example [22], where winner determination for Dodgson voting is shown to be
complete for parallel access to NP
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prefs = c1 > c2 > . . . > cn where c1 is more preferred by v to c2, etc. If an
election is weighted, each v must also have a non-negative integer weight, ω.
Given an election (C, V ) and a candidate c ∈ C, we will denote c’s
score in the election (if the election is taking place in a voting system that
assigns scores to candidates, as will always be the case in this thesis) as
score(C,V )(c), and the value of this score is as defined by the voting system
at hand, which should be clear from context. In many cases, depending on
the voting system, a winner of (C, V ) is any c ∈ C such that score(C,V )(c)
is the largest score in (C, V ). As a set of candidates can win an election, we
will sometimes look for a unique winner, one which is the sole winner of an
election.
3.1.1 Instance Encoding
For any problem in this area, we will assume that the instances are encoded
reasonably and that each voter and its preferences are an entry in the in-
stance, much like a ballot in an election. In some cases, we will instead
look at succinct elections, where one entry may represent multiple, identical
voters.
For instance, if there are k voters with identical preferences (and weights,
if weights may vary), then each must be separately represented in a non-
succinct election, that is, there are k distinct entries in the election. On the
other hand, the same k voters would be represented in a succinct election
as a single entry, but with the frequency count k.
While this may seem to be a small difference, succinctness can have an
impact on the complexity of problems dealing with elections. This is so
because complexity is measured as a function of the length of the input, and
input length for succinct elections can be significantly smaller than in the
non-succinct case. We will encounter this in some detail in Section 7.2.
3.2 Control
The study of control in elections deals with the possibility of affecting the
outcome of elections by changing the structure or makeup of the election.
This involves a chairperson in charge of the election adding or removing
voters or candidates, or partitioning voters or candidates into subelections
that precede the main election.
When attempting to exert control, one might go one of two directions.
One could try to make a particular candidate become the winner of the
election. This is called constructive control. On the other hand, destructive
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control is used when trying to make a certain candidate lose an election. In
either case, traditionally in control a candidate wins an election only if it is
the unique winner, that is, there are no ties allowed. Therefore, when we
are trying to make a particular candidate lose the election, it is sufficient to
make some other candidate tie the given candidate in order to make it lose.
The complexity of a number of control problems have been studied in
some depth. In [5], Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick initiate the research of con-
trol by looking at the complexity and possibility of constructively controlling
elections under the plurality and Condorcet voting schemes.
The destructive case was studied by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and
Rothe in [21], for the plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting. The authors
also performed the analysis for approval in the constructive cases, since [5]
did not deal with approval.
Please refer to Chapter 2 for background on the voting systems men-
tioned. As the definitions and results of the aforementioned papers will be
used in Chapter 8, let us present them here.
3.2.1 Definitions
Control problems largely include adding or deleting candidates or voters or
partitioning candidates or voters in order to make a particular candidate
win or lose the election. The problems are defined identically for each vot-
ing scheme (with the exception that in the case of approval voting, a voter’s
list of preferences is a 0-1 vector the size of the set of all potential candidates
as opposed to an ordered list of candidates), and the constructive versus de-
structive cases are similar enough that we can collapse them into the same
definition. The constructive case of each question will be stated with the
modifications for the destructive case in brackets. Nothing changes between
the two cases within the “Given” field of the problems. The following defi-
nitions are adapted from [5, 21].
Adding Candidates
Given: A set C of qualified candidates and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C,
a set D of possible spoiler candidates, and a set V of voters with
preferences over C ∪D.
Question: Is there some subset of D whose entry into the election would
assure that c is [not] the unique winner?
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In this case, the voters’ preference lists are assumed to be over all po-
tential candidates. That is, all candidates who might be up for election,
including those in D, are considered.
Deleting Candidates
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V of
voters, and k ∈ Z+ with k ≤ |C|.
Question: Is there some subset of k or fewer candidates in C [C − {c}]
whose disqualification would assure that c is [not] the unique winner?
Partitioning Candidates
When partitioning candidates, there are two intuitive ways that candidates
from either segment of the partition might compete:
• winners are determined from within the first segment defined by the
partition that go on to compete with all of the candidates in the second
segment defined by the partition, or
• winners from both segments are found and compete in a run-off elec-
tion.
In either case, an instance of the problem is the same:
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set
V of voters.
The question for the first case, Control by Partition of Candidates is:
Question: Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that c is the unique
winner in the sequential two-stage election in which the winners in the
subelection (C1, V ) who survive the tie-handling rule move forward to
face the candidates in C2 (also with the voter set V )?
The question for the second case, Control by Run-Off Partition of Can-
didates is:
Question: Is there a partition of C into C1 and C2 such that c is the
unique winner of the election in which those candidates surviving (with
respect to the tie-handling rule) subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V ) have
a run-off with voter set V ?
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In any partition, as described by [21], there are two tie-handling rules:
• TE, “ties eliminate,” where candidates that tie during subelections do
not move on to the next round, and
• TP, “ties promote,” where candidates that tie during subelections do
move on to the next round.
As is clear in Table 3.1, tie-handling rules do sometimes affect the complexity
of the partition control, depending on the voting system.
Adding Voters
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V
of registered voters, a set W of unregistered voters, and k ∈ Z+ with
k ≤ |W |. All voters have preferences over the entire set C.
Question: Is there a set of k or fewer voters inW whose registration would
assure that c is [not] the unique winner?
Deleting Voters
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and k ∈ Z+
with k ≤ |V |.
Question: Is there a set of k or fewer voters in V whose deletion would
assure that c is [not] the unique winner?
Partitioning Voters
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set
V of voters.
Question: Is there a partition of V into V1 and V2 such that c is the unique
winner in the hierarchical two-stage election in which the survivors of
(C, V1) and (C, V2) run against each other with voter set V ?
As in the candidatepartitioning problems, [21] contains an examination
of the voterpartitioning problem in both the case where ties eliminate can-
didates (TE ) from the run-off election and the case where ties promote
candidates (TP) to the next round. Again, the tie-handling rules do have
an effect on some voting system’s vulnerability to this flavor of control.
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Plurality Condorcet Approval
Control by Construct. Destruct. Construct. Destruct. Construct. Destruct.
Adding Candidates R R I V I V
Deleting Candidates R R V I V I
Partition TE: R TE: R V I TE: V TE: I
of Candidates TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
Run-off Partition TE: R TE: R V I TE: V TE: I
of Candidates TP: R TP: R TP: I TP: I
Adding Voters V V R V R V
Deleting Voters V V R V R V
Partition TE: V TE: V R V TE: R TE: V
of Voters TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: V
Table 3.1: ([21]): Summary of results regarding the complexity of control prob-
lems for plurality, Condorcet and approval voting schemes as presented in [21].
Constructive results for plurality (except for TE and TP for Partition of Voters)
and Condorcet via [5], the rest are from [21]. I = immune, R = resistant, V =
vulnerable, TE = Ties-Eliminate, TP = Ties-Promote.
3.2.2 Results
Table 3.1 presents the results regarding the computational complexity of the
voting systems Plurality, Condorcet, and Approval. The results label each
system as immune, resistant, or vulnerable to the given form of control. If a
system is immune to a particular type of control, it is impossible to perform
that control on an election in the system—that is, the preferred outcome
cannot be attained by performing the respective control technique. If such
control is possible, in these cases computing it is NP-hard (resistant) or in
P (vulnerable).
Since the immune and vulnerable control problems are in P and are thus
easily optimizable, we will be more interested in those which are proven
resistant. In Chapter 8 we examine the approximability of those control
problems which are resistant.
3.3 Manipulation
Manipulation is generally the problem of voters voting with dishonest pref-
erences for their own benefit. Like control, this problem has been studied
under numerous voting systems, in both constructive and destructive situa-
tions, and with a few variations, such as where the voters are weighted.
3.3.1 Definition
Generally, these problems are defined as follows:
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E-manipulation
Given: A set C of candidates, a set V of voters, a set S of potential ma-
nipulative voters such that V ∩ S = ∅, and a distinguished candidate,
p.
Question: Is there a setting of the preference lists of the voters in S such
that p is a winner of election (C, V ∪ S) under voting system E?
Note that, in contrast to the above definitions of control problems, we
here attempt to make p a winner, but not necessarily the sole winner, of the
election.
This is for the constructive case, where the manipulators try to make p
win the election. In the destructive case, the problem is defined identically,
with the difference that the manipulators attempt to make p lose. For the
weighted cases, everything is exactly the same except, of course, the voters
have weights.
3.3.2 Results
The study of the complexity of manipulation was initialized for the un-
weighted case was determined for some voting systems by Bartholdi, Tovey,
and Trick [26].
In [13], Conitzer, Lang, and Sandholm look at how many candidates it
takes for manipulation to become NP-complete for various voting systems in
the weighted case, and, in doing so, produce a more complete picture of the
complexity of manipulation. In the constructive case, manipulation becomes
NP-complete for many systems rather quickly if the votes are weighted, as
shown in Table 3.2. In the destructive case, the problem remains in P for
many of the systems analyzed, though they did find that it was NP-complete
for STV and plurality with a runoff.
Conitzer and Sandholm, in [14], try to find a generic method of making
manipulation difficult for all voting systems. This method includes adding
an elimination round to the election which precedes the actual election.
The candidates are scheduled for this preround in a variety of ways, in-
cluding deterministically (in which the schedule is decided before the votes
are gathered), randomly (schedule decided after votes are elicited), and in
an interleaved manner (in which the scheduling is done while the votes are
elicited). This relatively simple set of tweaks can make a voting system
PSPACE-hard in the interleaved case.
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Number of candidates 2 3 ≥ 4
Borda P NP-complete NP-complete
Veto P NP-complete NP-complete
STV P NP-complete NP-complete
plurality with runoff P NP-complete NP-complete
maximin P P NP-complete
plurality P P P
Table 3.2: ([13]): The computational complexity of weighted manipulation for
relevant voting systems with the given number of candidates (2, 3, or ≥ 4) in the
election. Excerpted from results originally presented in [13].
In [23] Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra present some dichotomy the-
orems regarding the complexity of manipulation for scoring protocols. We
will restate the main result of this paper here for the reader’s convenience
(modified only to keep notation consistent).[23]
Theorem 3.3.1 ([23], Theorem 2.1). For each m and each scoring protocol
α = (α1, · · · , αm), α-weighted-manipulation is in P if α2 = α3 = · · · = αm,
and is NP-complete otherwise.
3.3.3 Approximability
The optimization of manipulation is tricky to define. Clearly, we want to
minimize the number of voters that we manipulate in order to make the
preferred candidate win the election.
Do we say that when optimizing manipulation we only leave in the elec-
tion those voters for whom we have changed the preference lists? In this
case, the voters left out are also acting in a manipulative fashion by abstain-
ing. That is, there is little gained by the manipulators, who presumably
would like to minimize their chances of being detected, since they all would
be doing something manipulative.
On the other hand, do we keep all potentially manipulative voters in the
election after changing some of the voters’ preference lists? This would be a
vast departure from the original definition of manipulation since preference
lists would have to be defined for all potentially manipulative voters a priori.
In addition to being a radical change, such a move would make optimal
manipulation indistinguishable from optimal bribery (with unit prices) and,
thus, would be redundant.
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As we have been unable to find a suitable definition of optimal manipu-
lation, we will not examine the approximability of manipulation, which by
its nature demands an optimization problem.
3.4 Bribery
Bribery is a natural extension of manipulation and a natural problem in the
realm of voting systems.
3.4.1 Definitions
E-bribery
Given: A set C of candidates, a set V of voters, a distinguished candidate
c, and a positive integer k, the budget.
Question: Is there a set of at most k voters whose preferences can be
changed to make c the winner of election (C, V ) under system E?
This is the simplest version of bribery, where each voter’s price and
weight are the unit price and weight, assumed to be 1. It is also interesting
to look at problems where the weights (ω ∈ Z+) vary by voter, the prices
(π ∈ N) of the voters vary, or both vary independently. These problems
are referred to as E-weighted-bribery, E-$bribery, and E-weighted-$bribery,
respectively.
3.4.2 Results
The study of bribery from a computational complexity point of view was
initiated in [15], by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra. They
find the complexity of bribery for each of the variations mentioned above,
and for a number of voting systems. One interesting result of this exam-
ination is that plurality voting with weighted votes and varying prices is
NP-complete for as few as two candidates (the approximability of which is
studied in Chapter 7), whereas bribery in plurality voting with only one
of those qualifications is in P. However, for the case where the votes are
weighted and the prices vary, if either the weights or prices are encoded in
unary, the problem comes back down to P.
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra also present a number
of duality theorems regarding the complexity of bribery in scoring protocols.
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Finally, [15] also provides a look at the relationship between bribery and
manipulation, the latter of which has been studied previously and rather
thoroughly. In the authors’ words, “bribery can be viewed as manipulation
where the set of manipulators is not fixed in advance and where deciding who
to manipulate is a part of the challenge.” Of course, part of this challenge
is that each voter might have weights or prices that vary. In addition,
it is shown that any manipulation problem is many-one reducible to the
equivalent $bribery problem, so some of the known manipulation results
immediately give hardness results for equivalent bribery problems.
3.4.3 Approximability
Since these bribery problems are quite new, approximation in this context
has not yet been studied. In Chapter 5 we initiate this study and look at
the possibility of approximating bribery in general. Then, in Chapter 7, we
examine the approximability of bribery in the plurality system when both
weights and prices may vary.
3.5 Other Problems
Other manipulative problems, such as modifications of the above problems
and the complexity of lobbying [11] have also been studied. Analyzing the
above problems for other voting systems that have not yet received this
treatment is also a common source of new research (e.g., [37]).
Some problems are more inherent to the voting systems themselves in
that they do not assume some potential wrong-doing on the part of voters
or a chairman in the election. These include finding the score of a candidate
or the winner of an election in a voting system such as Dodgson’s [4], which
is shown to be complete for parallel access to NP [22]. There does exist an
algorithm which can often find the Dodgson winner of an election [24].
3.6 Average-Case Elections
When creating algorithms and heuristics that deal with performing some
operation on an election, it can at times be essential to be able to gen-
erate “typical” elections on which to test said software. In particular, a
heuristic should be tested against elections that contain realistic voters and
candidates, as otherwise it would be difficult to measure the efficacy of the
heuristic.
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While the most useful test cases would be data from actual elections, this
can be difficult to attain for a few reasons. First, we are not aware of any
countries that record the full preference lists of voters. Even in countries
such as Australia, where the full preference lists must be gathered to hold
single transferable vote elections, it appears that the only available data
lists the number of voters who vote for each candidate during each round.
Second, we could not possibly have the prices that voters would be willing
to accept as bribes, obviously because this has not been recorded. We might
also wonder if such data would be reliable, if collected, since bribery could
be an emotional and irrational activity for voters, so they might charge a
different amount than they might claim in response to such a poll, or they
might charge more or less depending on how their votes are to be changed
(which is mentioned in [15]).
3.6.1 Voter Preferences
The task of creating typical voter preferences has been studied both on the
computational and non-computational sides of social choice theory.
In a paper from the computational perspective [12], Conitzer looks at a
means of generating election instances by having each candidate and voter
choose a position on some number of issues, where each position is a real
value in the range [0, 1]. The voters then rank the candidates by their
agreement on the set of issues. This is essentially the spatial model which
has been studied in traditional social choice theory.
Aikaterini, in a thesis [1], mentions using essentially this spatial model,
specifically for comparing Greek electoral systems. The author compares
this method, using a normal distribution, to another method using a uniform
distribution.
In [10], the authors look in more depth at the spatial model. Perhaps
looking at this paper could, at the very least, lead to some improvements
over Conitzer’s approach. As the authors say, “Despite years of intensive
research on elections, we remain virtually without clues as to the likely char-
acter of the probability density of elections occurring in any electoral situa-
tion with more than two candidates.” This paper looks at a few parameters
used when generating an election within the spatial model, including having
the candidates’ stances selected as randomly as the voters’ are and making
the candidates more and less similar to each other. These three cases illus-
trate the situations where a candidate is basically a voter randomly chosen,
where candidates are rewarded for conceding toward the center, and where
candidates are chosen based on their extremism, respectively. One result of
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this analysis shows that experiments using the uniform distribution (where
the number of voters having a particular preference list is nearly equal for
each possible list) rather than the spatial model underestimated the usual
percentage of elections that will have Condorcet winners.
Some [39] have suggested interesting additions to the spatial model of
voter preferences, including direction (support versus opposition of a given
issue as opposed to simply “how close is this voter to the issue?”). The
result of these additions is a directional model of voter preferences. The
paper includes some historical data from previous elections which could
potentially be of use.
3.6.2 Prices and Weights
When we are considering generating elections where the voters have prices
and weights that both vary independently, it makes sense to think about gen-
erating these properties the way we would generate items for the knapsack
problem (see Chapter 6 for the definition and a discussion of this problem),
and we do think that this is one aspect of computational social choice that
could benefit from the research done on these problems.
Pisinger’s thesis [36] is an in-depth study of algorithms for the family
of knapsack problems. It contains a discussion of the techniques used in
finding a distribution of weights versus prices. These include random, weakly
correlated, and strongly correlated distributions. At least a weak correlation
would likely be suitable for generating such elections since one would imagine
that a voter with more weight will use this influence to gain a higher price
for his or her vote.
Chapter 4
Approximation Algorithms
Approximation algorithms are useful for optimization problems that are
believed to be intractable. In such cases, rather than having no solution at
all or waiting eons for one, it is often preferable to have a procedure by which
a solution within some error bound of the optimal is found in a reasonable
amount of time. An approximation algorithm can then be assessed by the
amount of error it allows as well as its time and space complexities.
4.1 NP Optimization
In the realm of decision problems, a binary, yes/no answer is all that is re-
quired. For instance, in computational social choice (Chapter 3), the prob-
lem of deciding whether a set of bribes can make a candidate win within a
set budget is a decision problem. The foundation of computational complex-
ity is on such problems (more specifically, on the languages that represent
the problems), and this rigidity and universality of a binary answer lends a
great deal of power to the field.
However, there are often times when one would like to know the optimal
solution to a problem. For instance, in the example above, it could be most
useful for a potential perpetrator of a bribe to find the cheapest way to
complete a bribe, rather than seeing whether a specific amount of money
will be adequate, as is the case for the decision problem. When a problem
specifies that a quantity should be maximized or minimized rather than
seeking a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, we call it an optimization problem.
NPO is the class of optimization problems that have NP decision prob-
lems at their core, where the goal is to either maximize or minimize some
quantity in the problem. For instance, the optimal bribery problem men-
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tioned above clearly has the related decision problem at the heart of it. A
more formal definition is given, e.g., in [6].
A subclass of NPO is PO, the set of optimization problems that can be
optimized in polynomial time. A problem in PO necessarily has an under-
lying decision problem that is in P since solving the optimization problem
simultaneously solves any instance of the decision problem. As such, the set
NPO−PO contains those optimization problems whose underlying decision
problems are in NP−P, or, often, are NP-complete. Of course, NPO 6= PO,
assuming NP 6= P.
4.2 Approximation
As stated in the previous section, we know that difficult decision problems
will have similarly difficult optimization problems, but we have more options
when solving optimization problems than we do with decision problems.
The key here is that we can exploit the, perhaps, multi-valued nature of
problems in NPO, the fact that we are looking for a biggest or smallest
value as opposed to the more binary nature of decision problems, where
only ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers are appropriate.
What if we could find an approximate solution to an optimization prob-
lem, within some error bound? That is, what if, for our optimal bribery
problem (assuming that its underlying decision problem is NP-complete),
we found an algorithm that could, in polynomial time, find a solution that
is provably no more than, say, 10% bigger than the optimal solution? Such
an algorithm could be very useful, indeed, especially considering the diffi-
culty of finding an optimal solution.
We will refer to an approximation algorithm as an algorithm that, in
time polynomial with respect to the length of the input, outputs a solution
that differs from the optimal solution by an error bounded by some constant
factor (say, twice the optimal solution).
The way in which the error bound is expressed varies a great deal in the
literature. We will adopt the notation of [19] and, to a lesser degree, that
of [44].
4.2.1 Notation
Let zA be the approximate solution output by an approximation algorithm,
A, and z∗ be the optimal solution for the same input. If the problem A
attempts to solve is a maximization problem, then it is said to be an ǫ-
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approximation algorithm if
zA ≥ (1− ǫ) · z∗
on all inputs. When A is approximating a minimization problem, it is an
ǫ-approximation algorithm if, on all inputs,
zA ≤ (1 + ǫ) · z∗.
These inequalities stem from the definition of the relative error of the
algorithm, A, as:
|z∗ − zA|
z∗
.
Then, we can use ǫ as the error bound:
|z∗ − zA|
z∗
≤ ǫ
for all possible inputs, where ǫ ∈ R and ǫ > 0, and simple algebra gets us
the earlier inequalities. In either the minimization or the maximization case,
the closer ǫ is to zero, the closer the solution output by an approximation
algorithm will be guaranteed to get to the optimal value, since an error
bound of 0 would imply that the algorithm would return the optimal value.
Also note that our definitions only make sense when z∗ is strictly positive.
That is, if z∗ = 0, then zA, no matter the error bound, is required to also
be 0, the optimal solution. Therefore, following previous research, we will
restrict our attention to approximating optimization problems where 0 is
not a possible optimal value.
4.2.2 APX
APX is the subset of NPO such that the problems included within it are all
approximable within a bounded error in polynomial time on the length of
the input. That is, each problem that has an approximation algorithm as
defined above is a member of APX.
Example 4.2.1. Consider the greedy approximation algorithm for the knap-
sack optimization problem (Chapter 6). The problem, in short, is to pack as
much profit as possible into a sack without exceeding the sack’s capacity.
The algorithm roughly works by sorting the items that can be placed in
the sack in descending order by their efficiencies (profit-to-weight ratios) and
placing the items in the sack in this order if they fit.
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Since the algorithm is a 1/2-approximation algorithm1 and it is for a
maximization problem, we are assured that the solution output by it will be
at least 1− ǫ = 1−1/2 = 1/2 of the optimal solution. That is, if the optimal
solution to a problem is 200, the lowest approximate solution that could be
output is 100.
Within APX are the classes PTAS and FPTAS.
4.2.3 PTAS and FPTAS
For some approximation algorithms, specifically, some greedy algorithms, ǫ
is fixed. While this may do for some problems or applications, it is generally
useful (and more interesting) to be able to make this performance ratio as
small as one needs for a particular application, although always with a cost
in time or space efficiency. In this case, ǫ is provided as a parameter to the
approximation algorithm. Such algorithms are often referred to as approx-
imation schemes because, in effect, there is a series of distinct algorithms
within the scheme, and the appropriate one is selected by the given ǫ.
When ǫ is a parameter to the approximation algorithm, it can also be
considered when measuring the time complexity of the algorithm.
If the time complexity of an approximation algorithm is polynomial on
the length of the input, then the algorithm is called a polynomial-time ap-
proximation scheme (PTAS).
If a polynomial-time approximation scheme’s time complexity is also
polynomial on ǫ−1 (inverted since a lower ǫ leads to a solution closer to
the optimal and thus takes more work), it is labeled a fully polynomial-time
approximation scheme (FPTAS).
A problem in NPO with a PTAS is said to be in PTAS, and similarly a
problem with an FPTAS is in FPTAS. It is easy to see that PO ⊆ FPTAS ⊆
PTAS ⊆ APX ⊆ NPO (illustrated in Figure 4.1), and these inclusions are
all strict, assuming P 6= NP.
The error bound, ǫ, passed to a PTAS or FPTAS will always be in terms
of the relative error of the algorithm as opposed to the following alternate
measures of approximation.
Example 4.2.2. If ǫ = 0.1 is passed to a PTAS for a minimization problem
(such as one in Section 6.4.1),
zA ≤ (1 + ǫ) · z∗ ≤ 1.1 · z∗,
1We will not prove this here. See Section 6.4.1 for more.
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Figure 4.1: Anatomy of NPO
so we are assured that the approximate solution returned by the PTAS will
be no greater than 110% of the optimal solution for the instance. We also
know that the time the algorithm takes to complete will be polynomial on
the length of the input instance. However, we have no assurance that the
runtime will grow polynomially as we get a more accurate solution, ǫ < 0.1.
If we had an FPTAS for the same problem, we would be certain that the
runtime would grow at a polynomial rate on both 1/ǫ and the length of the
input.
4.2.4 Other Measures of Approximation
It is not unusual to see error bounds for approximation algorithms expressed
in another way, namely, with respect to the absolute performance ratio
zA
z∗
≤ α
rather than the relative error [17]. This is most common when an algorithm
has a fixed value for the error—that is, when the algorithm is neither a
PTAS nor an FPTAS.
In this notation, it is often the case that one will cite a “2-approximation
algorithm” for a minimization problem. This can be confusing since in
notation using the relative error of the approximate solution, this would
mean that zA is no greater than three times greater than z∗, but what is
really intended is that zA is, at most, twice z∗.
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4.3 Some Results Regarding Approximation
A great deal of effort in computational complexity has been put into more
fully describing the class of problems that are approximable. In what follows,
we will attempt to summarize the main results that have been attained in
the study of approximation.
4.3.1 Strong NP-hardness and Pseudo-Polynomial Time
First of all, there are some conditions under which it is proven that finding
an FPTAS for a problem is impossible (assuming P 6= NP). In order to get
closer to understanding these conditions, it will be best to look first at a
subset of the decision problems referred to as NP-hard.
In [16], Garey and Johnson introduce the concept of strong NP-hardness.
If an NP-hard problem is NP-hard even when the values of the input numbers
to the problem are bound by a polynomial, the problem is strongly NP-hard.
Example 4.3.1. The most straightforward example of such a problem is the
well-known traveling salesman problem (TSP), in which the goal is to find
a Hamiltonian path in a given graph (a path through the graph that touches
each node without repeating any nodes) where the sum of the edge-weights is
below some constant integer, k.
If we were to restrict the values of the weights in TSP to the integers
0 and 1, the resulting problem would be equivalent to the Hamiltonian path
problem, which is NP-hard. This is so because an instance of the Hamilto-
nian path problem could be reduced to this restricted form of TSP by giving
all edges that exist in the initial graph a weight of 0, creating all edges that
do not already exist in the graph and giving them a weight of 1, and setting
k = 0. Therefore, TSP is strongly NP-hard.
On the other hand, if restricting the input values by a polynomial yields a
polynomial-time algorithm, the algorithm is said to run in pseudo-polynomial
time. That is, the algorithms take time O(p(n,m)) for all instances where
n is the length of the problem instance, m is the largest integer in the
instance, and p is some polynomial on n and m. These algorithms are said
to run in pseudo-polynomial time because they are polynomial on the value
of the input as opposed to the length of the input. One example of such an
algorithm is in Section 6.3.
Another way of thinking about pseudopolynomial time algorithms is by
changing the encoding of the numbers in the instance to unary (from a
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reasonable encoding such as binary). Now, if the algorithm runs in polyno-
mial time on the new length (which is really the sum of the values in the
instance), then the algorithm runs in pseudo-polynomial time. For a few
examples of such algorithms, please refer to Section 7.1. For this reason,
one might refer to strongly NP-hard problems as being unary NP-hard (as
mentioned in [16]).
The concepts of strong NP-hardness and pseudo-polynomial time are
related to approximation algorithms because [16] proves that in most cases
an optimization problem will only have an FPTAS if the problem is not
NP-hard in the strong sense. This is because the existence of an FPTAS for
a problem implies the existence of a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for
the problem, and the latter algorithm cannot exist if the problem is strongly
NP-hard, by definition.
4.3.2 p-simpleness
However, Garey and Johnson’s result is not quite as strong as it could be,
as proven by Paz and Moran a year later [35]. Amongst their results is
the definition of p-simple. A problem in NPO is said to be p-simple if
it has a pseudo-polynomial algorithm and the maximum value for a given
instance has an upper bound which is a polynomial on the length of the
input and the optimal solution to the instance. That is, for all instances, a,
max(a) = O(p(|a|, opt(a))) for some polynomial p.
Paz and Moran go on to prove that if there is a fully-polynomial time
approximation scheme for a problem, the problem must be p-simple. There-
fore, in order to prove that a problem cannot be approximated fully poly-
nomially it is sufficient to show that the problem is not p-simple. This is
stronger than the result in [16] since further qualifications are placed on any
problem which has an FPTAS.
4.3.3 Other Approximation Results
Ausiello, Crescenzi, and Protasi [3] have written a survey of approximation
which contains an introduction to NPO and its subclasses, as well as a fairly
up-to-date examination of what is known thus far about approximation.
4.4 Creating Approximation Algorithms
Approximating optimal solutions can be an extremely powerful tool in the
correct context, especially when the decision form of the optimization prob-
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lem at hand is NP-hard in the general case. So how does one go about
finding such algorithms, reducing the best-known time complexity dramat-
ically without allowing the rate of error to get out of hand?
4.4.1 From Pseudo-Polynomial Time Algorithm to FPTAS
It has been noted that Garey and Johnson showed that the existence of an
FPTAS for a problem implies that a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for the
problem exists. Therefore, a reasonable first step in the search for a FPTAS
for an optimization problem would be to prove first that the problem has a
pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm and is thus not strongly NP-hard.
Sometimes it is possible to perform the reverse of this theorem. That is,
it tends to be the case that pseudo-polynomial algorithms can be modified
to FPTASs.
For one, Woeginger [45] looks specifically at transforming existing pseudo-
polynomial dynamic programming algorithms into FPTASs by trying to find
a generic structure for dynamic programming algorithms that leads them to
be easily transformed to an FPTAS. The two most common approaches men-
tioned are referred to as roundingtheinputdata and trimmingthestatespace.
The main ideas of these are fairly straightforward. Both use dynamic pro-
gramming algorithms which are proven optimal but which are only pseudo-
polynomial. The former approach then rounds the input data in order to
make the algorithm run in true polynomial time, while the latter does not
round but rather collapses the number of inputs so that only a polynomial
amount of time is used.
Chapter 5
Approximating Bribery
Recall from Section 3.4 that bribery is a problem in computational social
choice that asks whether, given a budget, it is possible to sway an election
toward a preferred candidate and make it a winner of the resulting election.
While previous work [15] has shown that this is difficult (i.e., NP-hard) for
many voting systems, no work has been done regarding the optimization
and approximability of these problems.
As in Chapter 8, where we will study the approximability of some control
problems, we will here explore the approximability of bribery problems in
their optimization forms. We will present some general nonapproximability
results.
5.1 Optimizing Bribery
The most natural way to optimize bribery, and the most useful from the
point of view of the one doing the bribing, is to minimize the total cost
of the bribes. Whereas the bribery decision problems give an election, a
preferred candidate, and a budget that cannot be exceeded, when we are
optimizing bribery we will only be given the first two and we will find the
smallest budget necessary. All of the modifications listed in Section 3.4
(weights varying, prices varying, and both varying) could be optimized.
For any E-bribery problem, let opt-E-bribery refer to the optimization
form of the problem. The “opt-” prefix will be added to any modification of
the general bribery problem as is the case with the decision problems. For
example, E-weighted-bribery becomes opt-E-weighted-bribery, and so on.
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, we will only be examining approximation
for optimization problems with positive optimal solutions. For this reason,
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when optimizing bribery, we will only consider instances where each voter’s
price is a positive integer. Recall that this differs from the standard defini-
tion of the decision bribery problem, which allows prices with value 0. In
addition to this restriction, we will only consider instances where the pre-
ferred candidate is not already winning the instance’s election, as otherwise
the optimal bribe is 0.
5.2 A General Result
As was mentioned in Section 4.3.1, strong NP-hardness of a problem al-
most always implies that there cannot exist an FPTAS for a problem. This
fact immediately brings some answers as to the general approximability of
bribery problems.
Theorem 5.2.1. For any voting system E, if E-bribery is NP-hard, then
opt-E-bribery /∈ FPTAS, assuming P 6= NP.
Proof. This is so because there are no numbers in E-bribery except for the
budget. Since if E-bribery is NP-hard the problem will be NP-hard even
when the budget is bounded by a polynomial, E-bribery is not a number
problem and is by definition strongly NP-hard if it is NP-hard. Since there
can be no pseudo-polynomial time algorithms for strongly NP-hard problems
and an FPTAS for the problem would imply such an algorithm, there can
be no FPTAS for E-bribery
5.3 Manipulation and Bribery
In Section 3.4, we mentioned that Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemas-
paandra [15] have shown the reducibility of manipulation problems to bribery
problems. Here it is worth mentioning the relationship between the two in
some detail because the aforementioned reduction is similar to the reductions
that will be presented below.
Theorem 4.6 in [15] shows that a manipulation problem within some
voting system E is many-one polynomial-time reducible to the equivalent
$bribery problem in the same system, E . That is, given some instance of
the manipulation problem, M = (C, V, S, p), we can efficiently compute an
instance, B, of the $bribery problem that will be bribable given the budget
if and only if M can be successfully manipulated by the set of voters S.
The computed $bribery instance B = (C, Vπ∪Sπ, p, 0) is made by setting
• Vπ the same as V with each voter having price π = 1 and
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• Sπ to be S, each voter with price π = 0 and arbitrary preference lists.
This works since only the voters in Sπ are allowed to change their prefer-
ence lists, as the budget is 0. Once the changes are made to the preferences
of Sπ, this is equivalent to a manipulation having been performed, since each
voter in S in the manipulation instance M would have had to participate in
the election as well. Clearly, M and B turn out to be equivalent.
Note that this result also holds when both M and B allow voter weights
to vary and when M is unweighted but B is weighted.
5.4 Approximation, Unpriced to Priced
Now, using a technique similar to the one in the previous section we can show
that some bribery problems will not be approximable. As the reduction in
the previous proof essentially made the voters originally in the set V in
the manipulation instance unbribable in the bribery instance, our reduction
will make it so that any voters in V that are bribed will be detected by a
hypothetical approximation algorithm.
This way, any approximation algorithm for the version of the bribery
problem must also give an answer to the manipulation decision problem. If
the manipulation problem is NP-hard, then a polynomial-time approxima-
tion algorithm for the equivalent bribery problem must not exist, assuming
P 6= NP.
At first glance, this would seem like a trivial operation: we could simply
use the reduction from the previous section. Then the optimal bribery for
our reduced instance will cost 0 if the manipulation instance is manipulable,
and, since an the approximate solution must be no greater than (ǫ+1)·0 = 0,
a nonzero approximate solution returned by any approximation algorithm
immediately implies that the original instance is not manipulable. This is
too simple, of course, since our optimal bribe problems insist upon positive
prices, for reasons mentioned earlier.
This being the case, we will still add prices as in the reduction in the
previous section, but we will do so in such a way that any solution must be
positive.
This brings us to our next theorem.
Theorem 5.4.1. For any voting system E, if E-manipulation is NP-hard
then opt-E-$bribery is not approximable (not in APX), assuming P 6= NP.
Proof. First, let us reduce an instance M = (C, V, S, p) of E-manipulation
to an instance B = (C, Vπ ∪ Sπ, p) in opt-E-$bribery. The reduction will
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be computed by a function F (M,πV ) where πV ∈ N. As in the previous
reduction, we will make the voters in Vπ too expensive to bribe (in this case,
too expensive to bribe without being obvious). That is, the reduction makes
it so that
• Vπ is the same as V with the prices of each voter set to π = πV and
• Sπ is S where each voter is assigned an arbitrary preference list and a
price π = 1.
Now, say we have an approximation algorithm, A, for opt-E-$bribery
that runs in polynomial time with constant error ǫ ∈ R+. Then, given
an instance M = (C, V, S, p) of the manipulation problem we can calculate
B = F (M,πV ) = (C, Vπ ∪ Sπ, p), where πV = (|S|+ 1) · (1 + ⌈ǫ⌉).
Given B, we can calculate its approximate solution, which would be the
approximate price of bribing some subset of Vπ ∪Sπ such that p is a winner
of the resulting election. Let the approximate solution be zA = A(B). We
can now determine whether M ∈ E-manipulation, via two cases:
• If zA < πV , then the optimal solution, z
∗, can be no greater than
zA < πV . Since the optimal price does not allow even one voter from
Vπ to have been bribed, all of the voters bribed must have come from
Sπ. As Sπ is sufficient to manipulate the election, and it must be
likewise for S, M ∈ E-manipulation.
• Otherwise, if zA ≥ πV ,
z∗ ≥
zA
1 + ǫ
≥
πV
1 + ǫ
=
(|S|+ 1) · (1 + ⌈ǫ⌉)
1 + ǫ
≥ |S|+ 1.
Therefore, since the optimal solution spends more than it would cost
to bribe all of set Sπ, some voters outside of Sπ must be used to make
p a winner, and similarly S will not be sufficient in M to make p a
winner of that election. M /∈ E-manipulation.
As we have demonstrated, it would be possible to decide the membership
of an instance of an E-manipulation problem in polynomial time given an
approximation algorithm for the equivalent opt-E-$bribery problem. There-
fore, if E-manipulation is NP-hard for some voting system E , then opt-E-
$bribery is not approximable.
As allowing the voters’ weights to vary in both the manipulation and
bribery problems in the above theorem will not change its proof, this corol-
lary is immediate:
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Corollary 5.4.2. For any voting system E, if E-weighted-manipulation is
NP-hard then opt-E-weighted-$bribery is not approximable (not in APX),
assuming P 6= NP.
Additionally, since the existence of an approximation algorithm for an E-
weighted-$bribery problem would imply the existence of such an algorithm
for the equivalent E-$bribery problem, the next corollary is also direct from
Theorem 5.4.1.
Corollary 5.4.3. For any voting system E, if E-manipulation is NP-hard
then opt-E-weighted-$bribery is not approximable (not in APX), assuming
P 6= NP.
This result, while being rather simple, enables us to make a general state-
ment about the approximability of bribery. This corollary follows directly
from Corollary 5.4.2 and Theorem 2.1 from [23] (restated in Section 3.3 as
Theorem 3.3.1).
Corollary 5.4.4. For each m and each scoring protocol α = (α1, · · · , αm),
if it is not the case that α2 = α3 = · · · = αm, then α-weighted-$bribery is
not approximable.
Unfortunately, we do not have evidence that α-weighted-$bribery is ap-
proximable if α2 = α3 = · · · = αm, which would be the other half of the
dichotomy stated in 3.3.1.
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Chapter 6
The Knapsack Problem
The knapsack problem (KP) is a classic combinatorial problem and one of
the first known NP-complete problems. Simply stated, KP is the problem
of getting the most benefit while obeying the constraint of a budget. It is
this quality of the problem that makes it appealing from the perspective
of computational social choice, especially in bribery problems (Section 3.4)
where the benefit of bribing a voter (his or her weight in the election) must
be weighed against the voter’s cost. Specifically, we would like to draw
some parallels between KP and plurality-weighed-$bribery, bribing a plu-
rality election where both the weights and prices of voters vary. We will
examine this relationship in Section 6.1 in some detail.
Kellerer, Pferschy, and Pisinger [29] and Lin [32] have reasonably ex-
tensive and up-to-date listings of the many modifications which have been
made to the problem in order to make it applicable in a number of fields
and situations, but we will only cover the most common form as well as a
few of its modifications here.
This family of problems is applicable in numerous fields, from signal
processing [34] to electronic commerce [27]. In addition, the problem’s uni-
versality and ease of definition are also evident in the appearance of games
[41] (however trivial) written around it, as well as the study of forms of the
problem modeled after games such as Oregon Trail [9].
6.1 Similarity Between Plurality Bribery and the
Knapsack Problem
Let us first take a look at the similarities between bribery problems and
the knapsack problem, which is suggested by the authors of [15]. Indeed, in
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[15], the authors use algorithms similar to those used in KP for this bribery
problem. The two problems are surely not equivalent since stealing votes
from candidates who are ahead of the preferred candidate may decrease the
number of votes that need to be bribed.
For example, one approach toward directly reducing an instance, B, of
the plurality-weighted-$bribery problem to an instance, K, of the Knapsack
problem would be by considering the voters (with their vote-weights and
prices) in B to be items (with equivalent profits and weights) in K. Then,
the budget from B becomes the capacity in K, and the number of votes by
which the preferred candidate is losing becomes the target profit in K.
K B
items voters
profits vote-weights
weights prices
capacity budget
target profit votes needed in order to win
But deciding whether the target profit in this knapsack instance is reach-
able is not the same as deciding the bribability of B, as doing so does not
take into account the possibility of taking votes from the front-runner(s) in
the election and giving them to the preferred candidate. There is no clear,
equivalent operation to this in the knapsack problem since taking votes from
the winning candidate is essentially reducing the target profit in the knap-
sack problem.
However, there does seem to be a great deal of similarity between the two,
so exploring current approximation algorithms seems worthwhile. In the rest
of the chapter, we will look at the definitions of those knapsack problems
that seem pertinent along with some of their approximation algorithms, with
the goal of bringing some equivalence to the plurality bribery problems to
light.
6.2 The Binary Knapsack Problem
The knapsack problem asks “given a knapsack of a given size and a number of
items with varying sizes and values, is it possible to get a particular amount
of profit into the knapsack?” This can be viewed as a generic economic
scenario in which a businessman is trying to decide between a number of
options, each attributed with costs and profits, and choosing some subset of
these options so that he makes enough profit to stay in business.
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That is, we are given n items, each with weights (wi) and profits (pi),
with wi, pi ∈ N for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We are also given a target profit, k,
and a capacity, c. Now, we decide, is there:
xi ∈ {0, 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
such that
n∑
i=1
pixi ≥ k and
n∑
i=1
wixi ≤ c
Because the values of xi are restricted to {0, 1}, this form of the knapsack
problem is often referred to as the Binary or 0/1 Knapsack Problem. xi
decides whether item i is to be placed in the knapsack or left behind, where
a value of 0 leaves the item and a value of 1 takes it. Other forms of the
problem allow fractional amounts of an item (rational KP) or more than
one of an item (bounded and unbounded KP).
While this notation can make the problem sound awfully complicated,
let us look at a simple example of an instance of KP.
Example 6.2.1. Say you are preparing for a short backpacking (knapsack-
ing?) trip, and you have left food out of your knapsack until the end. You
will be able to carry 7 more pounds, at maximum, but you need to pack food
containing at least 7000 calories. Here are the items available to you:
Item Pounds Calories
soup 3 2000
trail mix 1 1700
crackers 2 1900
peanut butter and jelly 1 1500
bananas 3 3500
grapes 4 4000
Which items should you take to make sure you get enough energy during
your hike?
Solution. First, let us look at the problems in terms of the notation of KP.
• the capacity, c, is 7,
• the target profit, k, is 7000,
• the list of weights will be w = (3, 1, 2, 1, 3, 4), and
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• the profits are p = (2000, 1700, 1900, 1500, 3500, 4000).
There are a number of solutions to this instance, but let’s say you select
soup, trail mix, crackers, and peanut butter and jelly, for a total weight of
7 pounds (which is no greater than our capacity c) and 7100 calories (which
exceeds our target k). In this case, our solution vector (1s when we pack
an item, 0s when we leave it) would be set such that exactly the items we
picked would be selected: x = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0).
Some algorithms, both exact and approximate, for this decision formu-
lation of the Binary Knapsack Problem are covered in Section 6.3.
6.2.1 KP Optimization
Now, KP is actually a very common problem since profit is rarely encoun-
tered without a balancing weight which must be taken into account. But,
contrary to the above-stated decision problem, one does not always have a
target profit, k, in mind, but rather would like to attain as much profit as
is possible, given c. One might think of a burglar who has gained entry to
a home or shop and, only being able to carry a limited weight, must now
choose wisely in order to make his trip worthwhile. These types of circum-
stances are more akin to the optimization form of KP (as opposed to the
decision form, above), which does not give a target profit to be attained but
rather asks for the highest profit given the capacity of the knapsack.
More formally, we define KP optimization as trying to maximize
n∑
i=1
pixi
where
n∑
i=1
wixi ≤ c
xi ∈ {0, 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
wi, pi ∈ N for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Example 6.2.2. For instance, if we look at the situation in Example 6.2.1
with the same capacity of 7 pounds, but this time let us find the optimal
number of calories (profit) with the given capacity.
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Solution. When we look for the maximum number of calories that we can
carry, we find that we can get 8600 by taking the trail mix, crackers, peanut
butter and jelly, and bananas. As a solution vector, x, this would be x =
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0).
This is the more useful form of KP, at least in terms of this thesis, so any
future reference to KP (unless otherwise specified) refers to KP optimization.
6.2.2 Other Modifications of Binary KP
The plenitude of modifications of the knapsack problem perhaps speaks to its
fundamental nature in combinatorics and computer science. While Kellerer,
Pferschy, and Pisinger have cataloged many such modifications [29], we will
here define only those which are pertinent to the rest of the thesis. We will
sometimes refer to the “KP family” of problems, and in doing so intend the
problems in this section and the following. All problems in this family have
a solution vector (x) which is over {0, 1} and weights and profits in N.
MinKP
The Minimization Knapsack Problem, MinKP, is the inverse or the dual
of the knapsack problem. Here we have the same givens and attempt to
minimize the profit such that the cost exceeds some value. Or:
minimize
n∑
i=1
piyi
such that
n∑
i=1
wiyi ≥ d
where yi ∈ {0, 1} (serving the same purpose as xi in KP) and pi, wi are
defined as in KP.
To see the relationship between MinKP and KP, it is only necessary to
see that solving the equivalent instance of KP—maximizing the profit such
that sum of the selected weights is no greater than c =
∑n
i=1wi − d—also
solves the instance of MinKP. This is why we (and much of the literature)
choose to use this counter-intuitive definition where the profit is minimized,
for it makes the correlation between KP and MinKP more clear. Given the
optimal solution to the KP instance (xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), excluding the items
selected by this solution and including the rest will give an optimal solution
to the MinKP instance (yi 6= xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), and vice versa.
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However, an approximately optimal solution to one of the problems does
not necessarily yield a solution for the other that is approximate with the
same performance ratio, (ǫ). A 1-approximation for MinKP (which doubles
as a 1/2-approximation for KP) is presented in [19], which is an application
of an FPTAS for the more general problem of Capacitated Plant Allocation
[31] (essentially the minimization form of MCKP, below).
Example 6.2.3. Consider again the situation presented in Example 6.2.1,
but in this case let us say that you have not yet begun to pack, so there is no
capacity. You still want to get 7000 calories in your bag, but you just want
to do so in the most efficient way.
Solution. Here we would like to minimize the total weight of the items se-
lected. In order to fit this situation with the definition above, we can think of
this as either switching the weights and profits in the definition or switching
the two in our instance.
Either way, we find that we can pack a little as 6 pounds of food while
still getting 7000 calories by packing trail mix, crackers, and bananas. The
solution vector for this is x = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0).
MCKP
MCKP is the Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problem, wherein the items are
partitioned into n groups, or piles, of m items each, and the profit is to be
maximized with a given capacity while taking exactly one item from each
pile.
maximize
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pijxij
with
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
wijxij ≤ c
∀i(1 ≤ i ≤ n),
m∑
j=1
xij = 1.
As with KP, xij ∈ {0, 1} and pij, wij ∈ N for all i, j, and each retains its
meaning from KP. The only difference in the variables is that their subscripts
are two-dimensional, i referring to the group and j referring to the item’s
index in that group.
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One might intuitively feel that this is almost KP with the added dimen-
sion of groups of items, where the groups are disjoint collections of options
dealing with separate decisions which must be solved in the most optimal
means. On the other hand, KP is one collection of options for a single de-
cision. This analogy, however, does not entirely hold true since the number
of items in a group which can be selected is restricted to one.
Example 6.2.4. Perhaps the most straightforward example of an instance
of such a problem would be to imagine that you are packing for a backpacking
trip and you want to make sure that you get exactly one item from each food
group (e.g., fruits and grains), in an attempt to come slightly closer to a sane
diet. As before, you still want to maximize the number of calories in total
gained by packing the food with some constraint on the weight. Whereas
the other problems had only these constraints on weight and calories, an
MCKP instance would demand the extra qualification that the food packed
has exactly one piece from each kind of food.
MDKP
The Multi-Dimensional Knapsack Problem, MDKP, is another generaliza-
tion of KP. The dimensions referred to in its name are the number of con-
straints that must hold for a solution to be feasible. For example, if we think
of the burglar who is trying to fit the most profitable items in his knapsack,
in addition to ensuring that the items fit in the knapsack he might also want
to be certain that he is able to lift the total weight of the items. Here, the
weights and sizes of the items are two dimensions which are constrained by
separate capacities.
In our usual form:
maximize
n∑
i=1
pixi
such that for each dimension, j,
n∑
i=1
wijxi ≤ cj
and wij , pi, and xi are defined as usual. It should be clear that when j = 1,
this is simply KP.
This problem is in general strongly NP-hard [38], see Section 4.3.1 for
more about strong NP-hardness.
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Example 6.2.5. We could further the instance created in Example 6.2.1 to
get an example of an instance of MDKP.
Here, you might still be looking for the maximum number of calories,
since you need the energy to make it through the hike, and there will still be
a limit on the total weight of the food you take. In addition to these we could
add constraints on the less-appealing aspects of the food you will be packing,
such as fat content and the amount of sodium in them. We would then have
to find the amount of fat and sodium in each item, and these would count as
weights, each in their own dimension. Then, the problem could be phrased,
“how many calories can you pack without the food weighing too much or
containing too much total sodium or fat?”
KSP
A less well-known variant of KP is KSP, the Knapsack Sharing Problem,
concerns, predictably, the “equitable distribution of resources” [8]. The
original formulation of KSP by Brown [7] describes the KSP through a real-
world example of a manager attempting to evenly distribute raises so that
no job class would get left out or given preferential treatment.
Brown’s formulation is a little awkward to place in our perception of the
KP family thus far, so we choose to adopt what is essentially the notation
of Yamada and Futakawa [46] and others, though each is equivalent.
For a given instance of this problem, which consists of groups of items as
in MCKP, the goal is to maximize the minimum profit added to a particular
group while obeying some weight capacity. Or:
maximize min
i


m∑
j=1
pijxij


with
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
wijxij ≤ c.
Note that, in contrast to MCKP, the number of items taken from a
particular group is not restricted to one. In addition, the objective is a
maximin function as opposed to a simple maximization. Otherwise, the
binary-ness of KP is retained, and pij, wij are still defined as in MCKP. In
fact, if we restrict n, the number of groups, to one, then it is easy to see
that we are left with the original KP.
6.3. ALGORITHMS FOR THE KNAPSACK PROBLEM 53
Example 6.2.6. Similarly to Example 6.2.4, we might imagine an instance
of KSP where we want to get around the same amount of calories from each
available food group while obeying the same weight constraint. Here, wij and
pij represent the weight and profit (calories) of item j in group i. Whereas in
Example 6.2.4 we were trying to get exactly one item from each group, here
we will be looking for a solution that packs items such that the group that
has the fewest calories will be larger than it would have been in any other
solution. This will often lead to a more even distribution of the calories
amongst the groups.
6.3 Algorithms for the Knapsack Problem
Since KP is NP-complete, there are no known true polynomial-time algo-
rithms that are guaranteed to find solutions to instances of KP. While this
leaves us with essentially brute-force algorithms, a number of improvements
can be had over the most naive brute-force algorithm, and many of these
are reviewed in [30]. In addition, there does exist a pseudo-polynomial time
dynamic programming algorithm for it. This means that the problem is not
NP-hard in the strong sense (see Section 4.3.1 for a discussion of this).
6.3.1 The Dynamic Programming Algorithm
The traditional dynamic programming algorithm for the binary KP decision
problem looks at the optimal solution with a single item and progressively
adds an item until all of the items have been considered. For each additional
item, the algorithm examines each subcapacity between 0 and c. Since the
algorithm performs a constant amount of computation at each cell in the
table and there are n rows and c columns, the runtime of the algorithm is
O(nc).
We will call the dynamic programming matrix P and populate it as
follows:
P [j,m] =


0, if j = 1 and wj > m
pj , if j = 1 and wj ≤ m
P [j − 1,m], if j > 1 and wj > m
max{P [j − 1,m], P [j − 1,m− wj ]}, if j > 1 and wj ≤ m.
At each cell, the algorithm checks whether the current item under ex-
amination has a profit larger than the current subcapacity. If it does, then
the item is irrelevant at this size, so the optimum profit is whatever the
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optimum was without the item (i.e., in the row preceding the current one).
If the item might fit in the knapsack, it must be allowed a chance to be part
of the optimum solution, so the optimum without the item (P [j − 1,m]) is
compared to the optimum if we made room for the item (P [j − 1,m−wj]).
If we would be better off making room for the item and adding it, then this
is the optimal solution.
Once this procedure has run its course, the optimal solution for the
problem is the one where all the items are allowed and the subcapacity is
equal to c—that is, the value in P [n, c].
6.4 Approximation Algorithms for KP
6.4.1 KP
As the standard maximization form of the knapsack problem is most often
studied, there is a great deal of information on approximating it.
The greedy approximation algorithm
There is a simple greedy algorithm for KP that approximates the optimal
solution by a factor of 1/2, described by Martello and Toth [33]. The algo-
rithm starts by sorting all of the items in the instance in descending order
by their efficiencies, that is, their profit-to-weight ratios. Then, the items
are added to the sack as they fit until all of the items are tried.
If, at the end, the total profit in the sack is less than the profit of some
single item that is not in the sack, that item is placed in the sack alone. This
step is added because the simplest greedy algorithm will perform arbitrarily
badly otherwise, since there may be a large-profited but inefficient item
hiding in the back of the sorted list.
Fully-polynomial approximation schemes
One of the first FPTASs (see Section 4.2.3) ever to be defined is described by
Ibarra and Kim in [25]. The general idea is to scale or normalize the profits
so that the amount of work to be performed is feasible. This algorithm,
much as others following it,
1. partitions the items into those with small profits and those with large
profits,
2. scales the profits of those items in the large-profited partition down to
make them more easily handled,
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3. finds the optimal solution to the large (as in profits) partition using
the dynamic programming algorithm in Section 6.3.1, and
4. the sack is topped off with the small-profited items using the greedy
algorithm.
As the dynamic programming algorithm runs in time pseudo-polynomial
(polynomial time if the inputs have a polynomial ceiling), when the items’
profits are scaled correctly the algorithm will take polynomial time on the
new instance (specifically, in Step 3, above).
This algorithm is of particular interest because it sets the tone for essen-
tially every FPTAS discovered since it was published. A pseudo-polynomial
algorithm for a problem is used by first rounding the numbers in the instance
that will generally make the algorithm run in super-polynomial time.
Kellerer and Pferschy [28] improve upon Ibarra and Kim’s [25] algorithms
(as well as a number of interceding improved schemes) time and space com-
plexity greatly. The major difference with this newer scheme is that it breaks
the usual partitions into further partitions. Otherwise, the general idea of
the original scheme is left intact. This is the FPTAS for KP with the best
performance that is known currently.
6.4.2 MinKP
There is significantly less information available about approximating the
minimization form of KP. In the case of the decision problems or when
finding the optimal solutions to KP and MinKP, we can use an algorithm
for either KP or MinKP. Here, the solution to the unsolved problem is
simply the difference between the sum of the items’ profits and the found
solution. That is, given an optimal solution, z∗MIN, for an instance of MinKP
with target weight d, the optimal solution for the equivalent instance of KP
(with capacity c =
∑n
i=1 wi − d is z
∗
MAX =
∑n
i=1 pi − z
∗
MIN.
As such, one might expect an approximate solution to an instance of
one problem to similarly yield an approximate solution to the equivalent
instance of the other problem. However, this is not necessarily so.
Example 6.4.1. Consider an instance of KP where
∑n
i=1 pi = 300 and
the optimal solution is z∗
MAX
= 250, so z∗
MIN
= 50 for some c, d. If a KP
1/2-approximation algorithm finds an approximate solution zA
MAX
= 125 (the
lowest it could be), then we might expect the 1/2-approximate answer to the
equivalent MinKP instance to be zA
MIN
= 300 − zA
MAX
= 175. Of course,
though, this is well over 150% of the optimal in the MinKP case, so such an
assumption will not be true in general.
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While an approximation for the maximization case will not always serve
as an approximation for the minimization case (nor vice versa), there is an
algorithm that works well for both. The algorithm, called MinGreedy, is a
1/2-approximation for KP and a 1-approximation for MinKP. It is presented
in [19] by Gu¨ntzer and Jungnickel.
Since MinGreedy is working from the perspective of MinKP, first the
items are sorted in ascending order by their efficiencies. Then, the algo-
rithm fills the knapsack with the least efficient items until the next item
would make the knapsack reach its target weight (such that the sum of the
weights is at least d from our definition in Section 6.2.2). This solution is
remembered if the profit is smaller than that arrived at earlier for a feasible
solution, otherwise the item that would make the knapsack heavy enough is
forgotten about, and the next one is tried. Of course, this loops until all of
the items have been processed.
It is relatively surprising that it took until 2000 for such an algorithm to
be published, for it is not a difficult algorithm, and it is part of a well-studied
problem. We are not aware of an FPTAS for MinKP.
Chapter 7
plurality-weighted-$bribery
The problem plurality-weighted-$bribery asks whether it is possible to bribe
in a plurality election if the weight (how much a voter’s say counts) and price
(how much it costs to convince the voter to change his or her preferences)
of the voters may vary. This problem is NP-complete according to [15].
While Chapter 5 proves some general results regarding the approximability
of bribery, these do not apply to plurality.
While we have not found an approximation algorithm for plurality-
weighted-$bribery, we have proved results in Section 7.2 for a similar prob-
lem. Then, in Section 7.4 we examine some possible routes toward an ap-
proximation algorithm for the problem at hand.
7.1 Optimal Algorithms
There are two algorithms in [15] that solve plurality-weighted-$bribery in
pseudo-polynomial time (see Section 4.3.1 for a discussion of this concept).
This is done by solving the distinct problems plurality-weighted-$briberyunary
and plurality-weightedunary-$bribery, which are special cases of plurality-
weighted-$bribery where the prices of the voters and the weights of the vot-
ers’ votes are respectively encoded in unary rather than some more reason-
able encoding such as binary. As it is often the case that pseudo-polynomial
algorithms can be used to derive approximation algorithms, let us take a look
in some depth at these algorithms, called UnaryPricesBribery and Unary-
WeightsBribery.
These algorithms work by using a few dynamic programming algorithms
as subprocedures, including one for KP which is also pseudo-polynomial.
The main idea of both algorithms is to establish a threshold, r, which p,
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the preferred candidate, will fall on or above, and the rest of the candidates
will be on or under. r is not known in advance for an arbitrary instance of
the problem, so it is necessary to iterate over all of the potential thresholds.
At each threshold, an attempt is made to bribe enough of the voters who are
not voting for p so that scoreE(c) ≤ r for all other candidates, c ∈ C −{p}.
If this much is a success, then the algorithms check whether scoreE(p) with
the addition of the cumulative weight of the bribed voters is greater than or
equal to r. Should this be the case, it is clearly possible to bribe the voters
to make p a winner, so the instance is in plurality-weighted-$bribery.
In the unary prices case, it is possible to iterate over the sum of the
voters’ prices in the instance since this is a linear operation when they are
encoded in unary. Similarly, in the case where we are given unary weights,
the sum of said weights can be iterated over in linear time.
heaviest and cheapest
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra define the algorithms heav-
iest and cheapest in [15] to solve the most basic cases in UnaryPricesBribery
and UnaryWeightsBribery, respectively. Given a candidate and (sub)budget,
heaviest finds the voters (who are currently voting for the candidate) to bribe
that will give the most weight without exceeding the budget. On the other
hand, cheapest finds the least amount of money required to get a cumulative
weight of at least some target weight.
If we look at the voters in the election as items in an instance of KP
it can be seen that both of these are essentially the dynamic programming
algorithm for KP. In heaviest, we treat the weights of the voters as the profits
of the items in KP and the prices of the voters as the weights of the items
in KP. For cheapest we do the opposite (treat the prices as profits and vote-
weights as weights) and have to convert the instance from one of MinKP
(see Section 6.2.2) to standard KP.
In the main algorithms, heaviest aids in finding the threshold, r, and
cheapest helps find the value of the remainder of the budget after getting
the score of the first candidate down to the threshold.
Heaviest and Cheapest
These two algorithms utilize dynamic programming. Heaviest finds the
heaviest set of votes that can be bribed from voters voting for some subset
of candidates without exceeding a budget and getting all candidates in the
subset to have a score not less than or equal to a threshold. Cheapest sim-
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ilarly finds the cheapest way to bribe votes of weight reaching some target
from a subset of candidates while getting their scores down to the threshold.
7.2 Plurality Negative Bribery
There is a problem closely related to plurality-weighted-$bribery that is
also mentioned in [15]. This problem is pluralityweightednegativebribery,
the special case of bribery where a bribe cannot make a voter vote for the
preferred candidate, p. The weighted version of this is NP-complete, and
the problem remains NP-complete even when the number of voters who can
be bribed is not restricted, which we can call plurality-weighted-negative-
unbounded-bribery (this follows from the reduction from Partition given in
[15]).
The difficulty of the unbounded version of the problem leads us to the
conclusion that the optimization problem correlating to negative bribery
with plurality will not be approximable in the weighted case (and, by corol-
lary, will not be approximable when weights and prices both vary). However,
due to our proof technique, this will only hold when the elections are encoded
succinctly, as described in Section 3.1.1.
opt-pluralityweightednegativesuccinctbribery
Given: A set of candidates C; a multiset of voters V with full, strict pref-
erences over C and weights ω ∈ N encoded succinctly; and a preferred
candidate, p.
Question: What is the smallest subset of V that can be bribed to vote
for any candidate in C − {p} and make p a winner of the resulting
election?
Theorem 7.2.1. opt-pluralityweightednegativesuccinctbribery /∈ APX, as-
suming P 6= NP.
As in the proofs of nonapproximability explored in Chapter 5, we will
prove that this is so by starting with an instance of the decision problem
and transforming this into an instance of the optimization problem that, if
there existed an approximation algorithm for the optimization version with
constant error, would give the answer to the original instance.
First, let there be a function, F , which takes ωV ∈ N and I = (C, V, p)
in the form of an instance of pluralityweightednegativeunboundedbribery
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and returns I ′ = (C, V ′ = V̂ ∪W,p) an instance of opt-pluralityweighted-
negativesuccinctbribery, where:
• V̂ is identical to V but each voter’s weight is multiplied by ωV
• W is a set of voters of size |C| · g · ωV , where for each ci ∈ C, g · ωV
voters with weight 1 vote for ci, and g = score(C,V )(a)−score(C,V )(ci)
where a is a winner of (C, V ).
In the following Lemmas 7.2.3, 7.2.2, and 7.2.4, let us assume that I =
(C, V, p) is of the form of pluralityweightednegativeunboundedbribery, and
let us assume that I is a reasonable instance of this form. Here reasonable
means that in election E = (C, V ), the combined weight of the votes that
have to be taken from those beating p does not exceed the space available of
those candidates losing to p. To borrow some notation from [15], if Cabove ∈
C is the set of candidates beating p and Cbelow ∈ C is the set of candidates
losing to p, the following must hold for I to be a reasonable instance:
∑
c∈Cabove
(scoreE(c)− scoreE(p)) ≤
∑
c∈Cbelow
(scoreE(p)− scoreE(c))
If an instance is not reasonable in this manner, negative bribery cannot be
possible (no matter what the bound on the number of bribes made) since
there simply is not enough room for the votes that have to be moved around
to make p a winner. Let there also be I ′ = F (I, ωV ) = (C
′, V ′ = V̂ ∪W,p)
for some ωV ∈ N.
Lemma 7.2.2. Given I and I ′, above, and VB, V̂B the results of identical
bribes occurring in V , V̂ . p is a winner in election E = (C, VB) if and only
if p is a winner in election E′ = (C, V̂B ∪W ),
Proof. This is readily clear once one observes that, for any c ∈ C,
scoreE′(c) = scoreE(c) · ωV + g · ωV .
Therefore, if p is a winner in E (scoreE(p) ≥ scoreE(a) for any a ∈ C−{p}),
then p’s score in E′ will also be at least as large as any other candidate’s
score in E′. Similarly, if p is a winner in E′, p must also win E.
Lemma 7.2.3. Given I and I ′, above, and E′ = (C, V ′), there is always a
way to make p win by bribing some subset of W .
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Proof. One can make p a winner only using the voters inW via the following
process. For each candidate b ∈ C − {p} such that scoreE′(b) > scoreE′(p),
we will bribe scoreE′(b)− scoreE′(p) voters from W who are voting for b to
vote for the first candidate in C whose score is currently less than p’s. If
the candidate who gets these votes would have a score greater than p’s as a
result of these bribes, let the extra votes cascade to the next voter who is
losing to p, and so on until all of the excess votes have been bribed from b.
Since a voter in V ′ will be beating p by at most g · ωV in E
′, there
will always be enough voters in W to bribe using this process to make p
a winner. Also, as I is a reasonable instance of pluralityweightednegative-
bribery, this bribery defined by the above algorithm will always be possible
(i.e., there will always be some candidate for the voters inW to lend support
to without making that candidate beat p). Therefore, some subset ofW can
always make p a winner of E′.
Lemma 7.2.4. Given I and I ′, and an optimal negative bribe within I ′,
consisting of voters V˜ ⊆ V ′, if W˜ = V˜ ∩W 6= ∅ then |W˜ | ≥ ωV .
Proof. Assume for contradiction that |W˜ | is less than ωV for some optimal
bribe. Let there be elections E = (C, V ) and E′ = (C, V ′).
The votes from W˜ will not be bribed from some a ∈ C − {p} with
scoreE′(a) > scoreE′(p). Even in the closest situation, where a is the unique
winner of E and E′ and scoreE(a) − scoreE(p) = 1, then the gap between
a and p in E′ will be scoreE′(a)− scoreE′(p) = ωV . Even if all of the votes
from W˜ are taken from a and given to some candidate in C − {a, p}, a will
remain the winner.
Similarly, votes from W˜ will never be bribed from some b ∈ C−{p} with
scoreE′(b) ≤ scoreE′(p). The only reason that this would be attempted
would be to bribe these votes from b, then bribe a vote to b from some
candidate beating p with vote-weight such that it would have made b have
a score higher than p’s if the votes where not first bribed from b.
This will not occur when |W˜ | < ωV . Consider the closest case, where
scoreE′(p)− scoreE′(b) = (ωa − 1) · ωV (where ωa · ωV is the weight of the
vote that we would like to bribe to b). Then, even taking all of the votes
from W˜ and bribing them from b to some candidates in C −{b, p}, the new
difference between the scores of b and p will be
scoreE′(p)− scoreE′(b) + |W˜ | = (ωa − 1) · ωV + |W˜ |
= ωa · ωV − ωV + |W˜ |
> ωa · ωV .
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That is, bribing all of the voters in W˜ with |W˜ | < ωV away from b does not
allow votes to be bribed to b that could not have been otherwise, so this will
not be done in an optimal bribe.
As bribing fewer than ωV voters in W will never make p a winner of
the resulting election if it was not already a winner of E′, it would be a
contradiction to include W˜ with |W˜ | < ωV in an optimal bribery of instance
I ′. Therefore, an optimal solution to I ′ will always contain at least ωV voters
from W if it contains any.
Now we have enough background to prove our initial theorem, that opt-
pluralityweightednegativesuccinctbribery is not approximable.
Proof of Theorem 7.2.1. Given an instance I = (C, V, p) in the form of
pluralityweightednegativeunboundedbribery and an approximation algorithm
A for opt-pluralityweightednegativesuccinctbribery with constant error ǫ ∈
R
+, we could decide in polynomial time whether I ∈ pluralityweighted-
negativeunboundedbribery.
First, I ′ = F (I, ωV ) = (C, V
′ = V̂ ∪W,p), where ωV = (|V |+1) ·(1+⌈ǫ⌉)
would be computed. Then we would find the approximate solution to I ′,
zA = A(I ′).
If zA < ωV , since z
∗ ≤ zA by Lemma 7.2.4 there cannot be any voters
from W in the optimal solution to I ′, so it must be possible to perform a
negative bribery by bribing only voters from V̂ , thus by Lemma 7.2.2, it is
possible to perform negative bribery on I, so I ∈ pluralityweightednegative-
unboundedbribery.
On the other hand, if zA ≥ ωV , z
∗ ≥ z
A
1+ǫ ≥ |V | + 1, so the optimal
solution to I ′ must contain some voters outside of V̂ and by Lemma 7.2.2,
there is no subset of V which, when bribed, makes p win E. That is, I /∈
pluralityweightednegativeunboundedbribery.
As in either case we can decide I’s membership regarding plurality-
weightednegativeunboundedbribery in polynomial time, such an approxi-
mation algorithm cannot exist, assuming P 6= NP, since pluralityweighted-
negativeunboundedbribery is NP-complete.
Since an approximation algorithm for opt-pluralityweightednegativesuccinct-
$bribery would imply an approximation algorithm for opt-pluralityweighted-
negativesuccinctbribery, and the latter is not in APX, the former is not in
APX, either.
Corollary 7.2.5. opt-pluralityweightednegativesuccinct$bribery /∈ APX, as-
suming P 6= NP.
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7.3 The Two-Candidate Case
MinGreedy (Section 6.4.2) can be used to approximate opt-pluralityweighted-
$bribery when there are only two candidate to consider. In the two-candidate
case, we are only concerned with those voters who are voting for the can-
didate that is not p. Therefore, it is a trivial task to take an instance of
pluralityweighted$bribery and translate it into an instance of MinKP, where
all of the voters not voting for p are turned into items with weight equal to
their price and profit equal to their vote-weight, and the target profit is half
the difference between the score of the other candidate and the score of p.
Then, when MinGreedy is given this instance as input (after exchanging
profits and weights so that weight, and thus voter price, is minimized) it
will return a price no more than twice the price that it would cost to make
p win through bribery.
7.4 Attempted approximations
Despite the fact that bribery in plurality with both weights and prices vary-
ing is approximable in the two-candidate case, we know that many other
bribery problems are not approximable, and we are still not sure whether
there exists an approximation algorithm for pluralityweighted$bribery with
three or more candidates. Now, we will look at some attempts to derive
approximation in the general case.
7.4.1 Modifying Existing, Optimal Algorithms
One particularly straightforward attempt toward creating an approximation
scheme for opt-pluralityweighted$bribery would include modifying one of
the pseudopolynomial time algorithms given in [15] and covered in Section
7.1. These are UnaryPricesBribery and UnaryWeightsBribery, in which the
prices or weights, respectively, are given as input unary encoded. These
algorithms show that pluralityweighted$bribery is not strongly NP-hard,
for the algorithms are in P for the problem when the values of the prices
or weights are used (as opposed to the encoded lengths of the quantities) to
measure the complexity of the problem.
We might attempt to use UnaryPricesBribery [15]. It uses a subproce-
dure which borrows heavily from dynamic programming solutions to KP.
Even if this subprocedure, Heaviest were replaced by one of the FPTASs
for KP, with the appropriate reduction occurring beforehand, our resulting
algorithm would not be an FPTAS for pluralityweighted$bribery. This is
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so because there is a loop in UnaryPricesBribery which runs k times, where
k is the budget for the given instance. k is O(2n) for instances encoded
in any reasonable encoding, so this simple formulation will not be usable
as an FPTAS. But in UnaryPricesBribery, if k ≥ π(V ) (where π(V ) is the
sum of the prices in the instance), the algorithm immediately accepts. Since
k < π(V ) < n will hold when the prices are unary encoded, this loop does
not keep the algorithm from running in pseudopolynomial time.
We might also look at UnaryWeightsBribery [15]. This uses subroutines
Cheapest and cheapest which are dynamic programming solutions similar
to those used in the unary prices case. However, there is one rather signif-
icant difference because cheapest is really an instance of MinKP, not KP.
See Section 7.1 for more on MinKP and Section 6.2.2 to see that an ap-
proximation algorithm for MinKP is not necessarily one for KP. There are
known approximation algorithms for MinKP, but this fact is inconsequential
since UnaryWeightsBribery loops over the sum of the weights of the voters,
and this would lead any approximation algorithm based simply on replacing
Cheapest/cheapest with an approximation algorithm for MinKP would still
not necessarily be in P.
Therefore, the two most straightforward approaches toward an approxi-
mation algorithm for opt-pluralityweighted$bribery appear not to be feasible
(that is, unless some means of trimming the search space in the loops was
found), and so it is necessary to explore other means. The above approaches
are most desirable since rounding one of the inputs (essentially restricting
the input values to a polynomial) is a simple and often-used means of cre-
ating an FPTAS for a problem.
7.4.2 Greedy Heuristics
As the above attempts to translate pseudo-polynomial algorithms into FP-
TASs for this problem failed, we looked at some greedy heuristic approaches.
This tends to be a common way of coming to an algorithm that puts an
upper bound on the optimal solution for a problem (for instance, greedy
algorithms for KP).
The naive greedy heuristics essentially look at the voters in an election
as a set of items in an instance of KP. The simplest of these, which we will
call NG1, is the greedy heuristic for KP which sorts all items in descending
order by their efficiency (in our case, ω(vi)/π(vi)) and bribes each voter in
this order until p becomes a winner.
Next, let us call another heuristic NG2, which is basically the same as
NG1, but when sorting by the efficiencies, a voter’s ω is multiplied by two
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if the voter is currently picking a winner of the election. This change also
means that the order could change drastically between individual bribes, so
the sorting is done after each bribe. This could easily be changed to only do
so after a winning candidate is caused to no longer be winning by a bribe.
Other Greedy Heuristics
Some other potential greedy heuristics work on the basis of bribing sets of
voters, each set making scoreE(p) at least as high as some candidate who
was previously beating p. Here, the idea is to continually make progress
in p’s ranking, where in the naive heuristics above many bribes could be
performed without achieving any progress, in this sense. In addition, the
above-presented NG2 would be rather shortsighted when p is losing to more
than one candidate. In NG2, the likelihood of selecting a voter is only
increased when that voter is currently picking an overall winner, but this
tactic could obviously lead to bad choices, and in some cases it makes sense
to give some sort of weight to votes going toward any candidate currently
beating p.
We present a family of greedy heuristics. They consist of three general
steps:
Step 1 Use the KP greedy algorithm to find the cost of bribing voters
such that p will be beating c for each c ∈ C such that scoreE(c) >
scoreE(p).
Step 2 Bribe those votes associated with the minimum value from Step 1.
Step 3 Repeat Steps 1 and 2 until p becomes a winner.
So, in the simplest case, this heuristic only considers the votes that are
currently going to c in Step 1. The ωs of these votes are counted double
since the vote will be stealing weight from c and adding weight to p.
In a variation, in addition to considering the votes currently going to c in
Step 1, all votes going to candidates not beating p are also considered (but
their ωs are only considered singly, while those of the votes currently going
to c are still considered doubly). The rationale here is that, while those
extra votes are in general a distraction from the goal of beating c, there may
be some cheap ones that are worthwhile.
Another variation could change Step 1 from the one in the previous mod-
ification to include all votes going to some candidate other than c beating p
in addition to the rest. These votes are counted singly as if they were votes
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for a candidate losing to p. Again, the goal at each iteration is to make p
overcome some candidate, c.
One characteristic of this family that makes it feel more effective than
the more naive greedy methods is that the former bribe sets of voters at a
time rather than one vote at a time. The latter take one vote at a time and
continually change the weight that votes get as a result. These circumstances
make members of this family feel more stable to some degree and, perhaps,
more predictable for an arbitrary instance (whether this is the case or not).
At any rate, none of these heuristics appear to put an upper bound on
the error between the found solution and the optimal solution.
Chapter 8
Approximating Control
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the problem of control in voting systems in-
volves looking at the election from the point of view of one who can modify
the election to his or her liking, and from this point of view attempting to
make a particular candidate win or lose.
For some voting systems and methods of control, it has been proven by
either [5] or [21] that the underlying language for doing so is NP-hard (or, in
the terminology of [5, 21], the system is resistant to a particular method of
control). While, assuming P 6= NP, this is a reasonable assurance that the
control cannot generally be performed on an instance of an election using
that particular voting scheme, one might wonder how difficult it is to find
or approximate optimal solutions to such problems. As usual, the reasoning
goes that, while coming to the exact solution for a problem may be NP-
complete, finding an approximate solution within some error bound and in
a reasonably small amount of time can be both a desirable outcome and a
more feasible one.
We now present some results regarding some of the problems tradition-
ally studied, along with some modifications on these.
8.1 Adding Candidates
Traditionally, control by adding candidates is a decision problem where,
given an election and a set D of spoiler candidates, one attempts to make
a distinguished candidate, c, win or lose the election by adding candidates
from D. Of course, for this to work, the preferences of the voters in the
election must cover D as well as the candidates initially in the election. In
the deletion case, one tries to delete candidates from the set of candidates
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C in order to make c win or lose.
Let us call the problem of destructive control by adding candidates in
the plurality voting system plurality-ACD for short, and for the constructive
case we will use plurality-ACC .
It can also be interesting to ask how much of D must we add to make
c lose? Or, how much of C must we remove to make c lose? These are
the optimization problems related to the initial decision problem (which we
will call opt-plurality-ACD and plurality-ACC , respectively), and they give
us something we might be able to approximate.
Let us present some preliminary results regarding the approximability of
these problems:
Lemma 8.1.1. Neither opt-plurality-ACD nor plurality-ACC is a number
problem. Both are strongly NP-hard.
Proof. Neither problem allows voter weights, so an instance of either will
simply be sets of candidates and voters, neither of which needs to be repre-
sented using numbers—certainly not arbitrarily large numbers. The decision
forms of both are NP-complete [21], and any problem which is NP-hard but
not a number problem is strongly NP-hard, by definition [16].
Theorem 8.1.2. Neither opt-plurality-ACD nor plurality-ACC is in FPTAS,
assuming P 6= NP.
Proof. As the existence of an FPTAS for a problem implies the existence
of a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for the same problem, and there can be
no pseudo-polynomial algorithm for a problem that is strongly NP-hard,
if P 6= NP, there can be no FPTAS for destructive control by adding or
deleting candidates in plurality. This is proven in [16].
8.1.1 Weighted Cases
As previously mentioned, it can be useful to look at the cases in elections
where each voter has a weight assigned to it. Here, these cases are useful
because the problems are number problems, and thus are not immediately
strongly NP-hard as in Lemma 8.1.1. We will learn much about the un-
weighted cases by looking first at these weighted cases.
Weighted and Destructive
Let us define opt-plurality-ACDW , the optimization problem for destruc-
tively adding candidates to a plurality election where the voters have weights,
as follows:
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Given: A set C = {c, c1, . . . , cm−1} of qualified candidates containing a
distinguished candidate c, a set D = {d1, . . . , dℓ} of possible spoiler
candidates, and a set V = {v1, . . . , vk} of voters with preferences, prefs
over C ∪D and weights ω ∈ N.
Question: What is the smallest D˜ ⊆ D that can be added to the election
(C, V ) and assure that c is no longer a unique winner of the resulting
election, (C ∪ D˜, V )?
Now let us propose a statement with conclusions stronger than is posed
in Theorem 8.1.2:
Theorem 8.1.3. Optimal destructive control by adding candidates to a plu-
rality election where the voters are weighted (opt-plurality-ACDW ) is not
approximable (not in APX), assuming P 6= NP.
We are going to prove Theorem 8.1.3 by contradiction, but, first, let us
explain the idea behind the proof and prove some intermediate results.
Proof Idea We will write a function that takes an instance I in the form
of plurality-ACD and outputs an instance I
′ ∈ opt-plurality-ACDW , where a
number of extra candidates and voters have been added and weights have
been added to all of the preexisting voters. Once we have this new instance,
we will show that any approximation algorithm for opt-plurality-ACDW nec-
essarily decides plurality-ACD. As the approximation algorithm and our
function are both in polynomial time, their combination is a polynomial
time algorithm for plurality-ACD, which cannot exist assuming P 6= NP,
since plurality-ACD is NP-hard.
In order to make I ′ optimizable, we must make it so that there are always
some spoiler candidates who can make the distinguished candidate not the
unique winner (as, if there is no set that will be successful, there is nothing
to optimize). This is assured by Lemma 8.1.6.
In order to accomplish this, we must add some new candidates and voters
that will always be able to make the distinguished candidate lose, but, at
the same time, we want the original set of spoiler candidates to be able
to change the outcome of the new election in a way equivalent to the way
they do in the old one (Lemmas 8.1.4 and 8.1.5). We will add the new
candidates and voters in such a way that if the new spoiler candidates are
added to the election in the approximate solution, so many would need to be
added (with respect to the approximation algorithm’s error bound) that the
approximation algorithm betrays the fact that these new candidates must
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be used (Lemma 8.1.7). If this occurs, the original set of spoiler candidates
is inadequate, so we know that the original instance is not in plurality-ACD.
If none of the new candidates are used, the approximate solution will be
smaller with respect to its error bound, so we will know that the original
spoilers are sufficient—the original instance is in plurality-ACD.
Now, we present some intermediate results.
Let FW be a function from an instance I = (C,D, V, c) (in the proper
form of an instance of plurality-ACD) and ωV ∈ N to I
′ = (C ′,D′, V ′, c) ∈
opt-plurality-ACDW , defined as follows:
• C ′ = C ∪ D̂,
• D′ = D ∪ F ,
• V ′ = V̂ ∪ V1 ∪ V2 ∪ V3, and
• c remains as it was in I,
where the extra candidates D̂ and F are defined as
• D̂ = {dˆ1, . . . , dˆ|D|} and
• F = {f1, . . . , fg·ωV } where g = score(C,V )(c) − score(C,V )(a) where a
is the candidate with the next highest score in the election (C, V )
and the new voters V̂ , V1, V2, and V3 are defined as
• V̂ = {vˆ1, . . . , vˆ|V |}, where vˆi = vi with weight ω = ωV and all candi-
dates in D̂ ∪ F added to the end of vi’s prefs ,
• V1 = {v1, . . . , v|F |}, each with ω = 1 and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ |F |, vi’s
prefs = fi > c > . . . over C
′ ∪D′ where fi ∈ F ,
• V2 = {v1, . . . , v|C|−1}, each with ω = g ·ωV and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ |C|−1,
vi’s prefs = ci > . . . over C
′ ∪D′ where ci ∈ C − {c}, and
• V3 = {v1, . . . , v|D|}, each with weight ω = g · ωV and for each 1 ≤ i ≤
|D|, vi’s prefs = di > dˆi > . . . over C
′ ∪D′ where di ∈ D and dˆi ∈ D̂.
For the following Lemmas 8.1.4, 8.1.5, 8.1.6, and 8.1.7, let us assume
there exists I = (C,D, V, c) and I ′ = FW (I, ωV ) = (C
′,D′ = (D ∪ F ), V ′ =
(V̂ ∪ V1 ∪ V2 ∪ V3), c) for some ωV ∈ Z
+.
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Figure 8.1: An initial instance of plurality-ACD.
Lemma 8.1.4. If D˜ ⊆ D, the scores of any candidate a ∈ C∪D˜ in elections
E = (C ∪ D˜, V ) and E′ = (C ′ ∪ D˜, V ′) are related as follows:
scoreE′(a) = g · ωV + scoreE(a) · ωV .
Proof. As for each vi ∈ V that votes for a in E, the equivalent vˆi ∈ V̂
will vote for a in E′, and since each vˆi has weight ωV , score(C′∪ eD,bV )(a) =
scoreE(a) · ωV .
Now to account for the g · ωV term. There are exactly three places a
could fall: a = c, a ∈ C − {c}, or a ∈ D˜.
In the first case, a = c, all of the voters in V1 will vote for a in E
′, giving
a weight g · ωV . This is so because no candidates from F are present in E
′,
so the first preference for each member of V1 will be c.
In the next case, a ∈ C − {c}, a voter in V2 with weight g · ωV will vote
for a in E′, by definition of I ′.
Finally, when a ∈ D˜, one of the voters in V3 will give a g · ωV in E
′.
As each case leaves a with g · ωV + scoreE(a) · ωV weight in election E
′
and there are no other voters to be considered, this will always be the case
for a ∈ C ∪ D˜.
Lemma 8.1.5. A set of candidates D˜ ⊆ D exists such that c is not the
unique winner of election E = (C ∪ D˜, V ) if and only if c is not the unique
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Figure 8.2: The output of FW when given as input the instance from Figure
8.1 and some ωV .
winner in election E′ = (C ′ ∪ D˜, V ′).
Proof. (=⇒) If c is not the unique winner of election E, then c will not be
the unique winner of E′. Since c is not the unique winner of E, there must
be some b ∈ (C − {c}) ∪ D˜ such that
scoreE(b) ≥ scoreE(c).
Since by Lemma 8.1.4, scoreE′(b) = g·ωV+scoreE(b)·ωV and scoreE′(c) =
g · ωV + scoreE(c) · ωV , clearly scoreE′(b) ≥ scoreE′(c), so c is not a unique
winner of E′.
(⇐=) If c is not the unique winner of election E′, then c will not be the
unique winner of E. As in the converse, when c is not the winner of E′, we
know that there is some candidate b ∈ (C − {c}) ∪ D˜ such that
scoreE′(b) ≥ scoreE′(c),
so by Lemma 8.1.4
g · ωV + scoreE(b) · ωV ≥ g · ωV + scoreE(c) · ωV ,
which clearly implies that scoreE(b) ≥ scoreE(c), that is, c is not the unique
winner of E.
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As both implications hold, some D˜ ⊆ D exists such that c is not the
unique winner of E if and only if the same D˜ ensures that c is not the unique
winner in E′. In other words, there is a subset of D that, when added to
the election implied by the original instance, makes c lose if and only if
c loses when the same subset is added to the election of the transformed
instance.
Lemma 8.1.6. Candidate c will not be the unique winner in election (C ′ ∪
F, V ′).
Proof. Recall, by the definition of g in FW ,
score(C,V )(c) − score(C,V )(a) = g
for some a ∈ C − {c}, and, by Lemma 8.1.4,
score(C′,V ′)(c) = g · ωV + score(C,V )(c) · ωV
score(C′,V ′)(a) = g · ωV + score(C,V )(a) · ωV
= ωV · (g + score(C,V )(a))
= score(C,V )(c) · ωV
thus
score(C′,V ′)(a) = score(C′,V ′)(c)− g · ωV .
Now, when we consider the election (C ′ ∪ F, V ′), all votes vi ∈ V1 which
contribute to score(C′,V ′)(c) will instead vote for fi ∈ F , as this is how each
vi’s prefs is defined. Since |F | = g ·ωV and each, when added to the election,
will take 1 unit of weight from c,
score(C′∪F,V ′)(c) = score(C′,V ′)(c)− g · ωV
= score(C′,V ′)(a)
= score(C′∪F,V ′)(a).
Therefore, c is not a unique winner in (C ′ ∪ F, V ′).
Lemma 8.1.7. In addition to I and I ′, let D˜ be the smallest subset of D′
such that c is not the unique winner of (C ′ ∪ D˜, V ′). If F˜ = D˜ ∩ F 6= ∅,
|F˜ | ≥ ωV .
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Proof. Assume for contradiction that we have an optimal D˜ and F˜ as de-
scribed above, and |F˜ | < ωV .
Recall that by the definition of V ′, the only voter that could give vote-
weight to a candidate fi ∈ F on addition of fi to an election with voters
V ′ is a member of V1, and that each of these voters originally (in election
(C ′, V ′) gives vote-weight 1 to c. Each member of F has only the power to
remove vote-weight 1 from c; it neither has the ability to win an election
nor to remove weight from any other candidate in C ′ ∪D′ − {c}.
For any a ∈ (C ′ − {c}) ∪ D˜ there exists some t ∈ Z such that
score(C′∪ eD− eF,V ′)(c) = score(C′∪ eD− eF ,V ′)(a) + t · ωV .
But if t ≥ 1 (c beats a in election (C ′ ∪ D˜ − F˜ , V ′)) and |F˜ | < ωV (by our
assumption),
score(C′∪ eD,V ′)(c) > score(C′∪ eD,V ′)(a),
that is, c will beat a regardless of the addition of F˜ , and this is a contradic-
tion since D˜ cannot not be optimal.
Therefore, if c wins (C ′ ∪ D˜ − F˜ , V ′), c also wins election (C ′ ∪ D˜, V ′).
Since F˜ is unnecessary, D˜ is trivially smaller by the exclusion of F˜ , so F˜
would never be part of a smallest such D˜.
Now we are able to prove our main theorem, that opt-plurality-ACDW is
not approximable.
Proof of Theorem 8.1.3. We will prove Theorem 8.1.3 by contradiction by
assuming that there is an approximation algorithm for opt-plurality-ACDW ,
A. On input I ′ = (C ′,D′, V ′, c), A returns an approximate solution zA such
that z∗ ≤ zA ≤ (1+ǫ)z∗, where z∗ is the optimal solution to I ′ and ǫ ∈ R+ is
a constant. Recall that these optimal and approximate solutions are in terms
of the size of the smallest (and approximately smallest, respectively) subset
D˜ ⊆ D′ that will make c not the unique winner of election (C ′ ∪ D˜, V ′).
But if there was such an A, given an instance I = (C,D, V, c) in the form
of the problem plurality-ACD, A could be used to find an optimal solution to
I. First, I ′ = FW (I, ωV = (1+ ⌈ǫ⌉) · |D|+1) = (C
′,D′ = D∪F, V ′, c) would
be generated, and the approximate solution zA = A(I ′) would be computed.
By Lemma 8.1.6, we know that even when there is no subset D˜ of D that
makes c lose election (C∪D˜, V ) that there will always be some D′′ ⊆ D′ that
will make c lose (C ′ ∪D′′, V ′), so z∗ and zA will always be positive integers,
and we know that we only need worry about the following two cases:
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• zA ≤ (1 + ⌈ǫ⌉) · |D|, then we know
z∗ ≤ (1 + ⌈ǫ⌉) · |D| < ωV .
By Lemma 8.1.7, this implies that no subset of F is present in the
optimal solution to I ′, that is, some D˜ ⊆ D exists such that c is not
the unique winner in election (C ′ ∪ D˜, V ′). Then, by Lemma 8.1.5, we
know that this D˜ exists if and only if c is also not the unique winner
of (C ∪ D˜, V ). Therefore, I ∈ plurality-ACD.
• zA > (1 + ⌈ǫ⌉) · |D| on input I ′. Then
z∗ ≥
zA
1 + ǫ
>
(1 + ǫ) · |D|
1 + ǫ
> |D|,
so some subset of F must be included in an optimal solution to I ′.
Thus we know that not even adding all of D to the election can make
c lose—otherwise, that would be the optimal solution. That is, c will
win election (C ′∪D,V ′) and election (C∪D,V ) by Lemma 8.1.5, and,
therefore, I /∈ plurality-ACD.
In sum, if there was such an A for opt-plurality-ACDW , by taking an
instance I of the form of a problem in plurality-ACD, we could deter-
mine in polynomial time whether or not I ∈ plurality-ACD by finding
I ′ = FW (I, ωV ) (since ǫ is a constant, FW will be polynomial) and us-
ing I ′ as input to A. Assuming P 6= NP, this is a contradiction, since
plurality-ACD is NP-hard. Therefore opt-plurality-ACDW is not approx-
imable, opt-plurality-ACDW /∈ APX.
Following directly from Theorem 8.1.3:
Corollary 8.1.8. opt-plurality-ACD is not approximable (not in APX),
assuming P 6= NP.
Proof. The same proof will hold if we make FW add a number of voters
equal to the weight of the voters added (rather than adding a single voter
with its respective weight in the weighted case) to the new instance.
Weighted and Constructive
As above, we will define plurality-ACCW , the optimization problem for con-
structively adding candidates to a plurality election where the voters have
weights, as
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Given: A set C = {c, c1, . . . , cm−1} of qualified candidates containing a
distinguished candidate c, a set D = {d1, . . . , dl} of possible spoiler
candidates, and a set V = {v1, . . . , vk} of voters with preferences over
C ∪D and weights ω ∈ N.
Question: What is the smallest D˜ ⊆ D that can be added to the election
and assure that c is a unique winner of the resulting election, (C ∪
D˜, V )?
We will prove the same result as in the destructive case, that is:
Theorem 8.1.9. Optimal constructive control by adding candidates to a
plurality election where the voters are weighted (plurality-ACCW ) is not ap-
proximable (not in APX), assuming P 6= NP.
Proof Idea As in the previous proof, we will define a construction that will
take an unweighted instance and return a weighted instance that will betray
the answer to the former with a polynomial-time approximation algorithm.
As such, the method is rather similar to that used for opt-plurality-ACDW
(Theorem 8.1.3), with the crucial difference that the extra candidates and
voters put into the weighted instance will be created so that they will be able
to remove weight from any candidate who is not c, our distinguished candi-
date (as opposed to being able to remove weight from c in the destructive
case).
Now let us present some intermediate results.
Let FW be a function from an instance I = (C,D, V, c) (in the proper
form of an instance of plurality-ACC) and ωV ∈ N, to I
′ = (C,D′ = D ∪
D̂, V ′ = V̂ ∪W ∪ {vc}, c) ∈ plurality-ACCW , where:
• D̂ = (dˆ11, . . . , dˆij , . . . , dˆ|C−{c}|ℓ) where ℓ = (g · ωV + ωV − 1) and g =
score(C,V )(a)− score(C,V )(c) + 1 such that a ∈ C − {c} is a winner of
election (C, V ),
• V̂ = {vˆ1, . . . , vˆ|V |}, where for each 1 ≤ i ≤ |V |, vˆi = vi with weight
ω = ωV and all candidates in D̂ added to the end of vi’s prefs ,
• W = {wij | ci ∈ C − {c} and 1 ≤ j ≤ g · ωV + ωV − 1 and ω =
1 and prefs = dˆij > ci > . . . and dˆij ∈ D̂}, and
• vc has weight g · ωV and prefs = c > . . . .
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For the following Lemmas 8.1.10, 8.1.11, 8.1.12, and 8.1.13, let there
be defined I = (C,D, V, c) and I ′ = FW (I, ωV ) = (C,D
′ = D ∪ D̂, V ′ =
V̂ ∪W ∪ {vc}, c) for any ωV ∈ N.
Lemma 8.1.10. Let there be elections E = (C∪D˜, V ) and E′ = (C∪D˜, V ′)
for any D˜ ⊆ D. If b ∈ C−{c}, scoreE′(b) = scoreE(b)·ωV +g ·ωV +(ωV −1).
Also, scoreE′(c) = scoreE(c) · ωV + g · ωV .
Proof. This is so because if b ∈ C − {c}, by definition of FW , each point
gained in E by b is matched by a vote-weight of ωV in E
′ by the corre-
sponding voter in V̂ , thus score(C,bV )(b) = scoreE(b) · ωV . In addition, the
voters W will lend g · ωV + ωV − 1 points to such a b, for a final score of
scoreE′(b) = scoreE(b) · ωV + g · ωV + (ωV − 1).
For c, the initial scoreE(c) · ωV points also come from the set V̂ . The
remaining points are due to the voter vc.
Lemma 8.1.11. Let there be elections E = (C∪D˜, V ) and E′ = (C∪D˜, V ′)
for any D˜ ⊆ D. c is the unique winner of E if and only if c is the unique
winner of E′.
Proof. (=⇒) If scoreE(c) > scoreE(a), then scoreE′(c) > scoreE′(a). By
Lemma 8.1.10,
scoreE′(c) = (scoreE(c) + g) · ωV
and
scoreE′(a) = (scoreE(a) + g) · ωV + ωV − 1.
Since scoreE(c) ≥ scoreE(a) + 1,
scoreE′(c) ≥ (scoreE(a) + 1 + g) · ωV = (scoreE(a) + g) · ωV + ωV
> scoreE′(a).
(⇐=) If scoreE′(c) > scoreE′(a), then scoreE(c) > scoreE(a). This is
so since by Lemma 8.1.10,
scoreE(c) · ωV + g · ωV > scoreE(a) · ωV + g · ωV + ωV − 1
which implies
scoreE(c) · ωV > scoreE(a) · ωV + ωV − 1
so certainly scoreE(c) > scoreE(a).
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Lemma 8.1.12. Let there be elections E = (C, V ) and E′ = (C, V ′). There
exists some D˜ ⊆ D̂ such that c wins (C ∪ D˜, V ′).
Proof. As c could not lose any voters by adding D˜ to the election,
score(C∪ eD,V ′)(c) = scoreE′(c) = scoreE(c) · ωV + g · ωV + (ωV − 1)
by Lemma 8.1.10. If a ∈ C is a winner of E,
scoreE′(c) = scoreE(c) · ωV + g · ωV + (ωV − 1)
= scoreE(c) · ωV + (1 + scoreE(a)− scoreE(c)) · ωV + (ωV − 1)
= (1 + scoreE(a)) · ωV + ωV − 1.
Let us take D˜ = D̂, that is, let us add all candidates in D̂ to election E′.
Since score(C∪ bD,V ′)(a) = scoreE′(a) − (g · ωV + ωV − 1), by Lemma 8.1.10
score
(C∪ bD,V ′)
(a) = scoreE(a), which is clearly less than score(C∪ bD,V ′)(c).
Therefore, c will uniquely win (C ∪ D̂, V ′).
Lemma 8.1.13. Let there also be elections E = (C ∪ D˜, V ′) and E′ =
(C ∪ D˜ ∪G,V ′), where D˜ ⊆ D and G ⊆ D̂. If D˜ ∪G is an optimal solution
to I ′ and G 6= ∅, |G| ≥ ωV .
Proof. Say 0 < |G| < ωV . Then G will, at best, take ωV − 1 points from a
single candidate in C − {c}. Say these points affect entirely a ∈ C − {c},
where a is a winner of E.
Then scoreE′(a) = scoreE(a) − (ωV − 1). Since a is a winner of E,
Lemma 8.1.10 implies that
scoreE(a) ≥scoreE(c) + (ωV − 1)
scoreE′(a) ≥scoreE′(c),
so c cannot possibly win E′ unless it also uniquely wins E and therefore the
inclusion of G has no bearing on the outcome of E′ with respect to c and
will not be included in an optimal solution to I ′.
Now we are able to prove Theorem 8.1.9.
Proof of Theorem 8.1.9. Assume there is an approximation algorithm, A,
which finds approximate solutions to instances of plurality-ACCW in poly-
nomial time with error bounded by some constant ǫ ∈ R+. Given an in-
stance I = (C,D, V, c), we can in polynomial time derive I ′ = FW (I, ωV =
(|D| + 1) · (1 + ⌈ǫ⌉) = (C,D′ = D ∪ D̂, V ′ = V̂ ∪ W ∪ {vc}, c). FW will
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only take polynomial time since ǫ is a constant—ωV is simply written as a
parameter to make the earlier proofs simpler. We can then find the approx-
imate solution to I ′, zA = A(I ′), the approximate size of the subset of D′
that needs to be added to the election in order to make c a unique winner.
If zA < ωV , I ∈ plurality-ACC . Since the optimal solution, z
∗ is at
most zA, the corresponding solution could not contain any subset of D̂, by
Lemma 8.1.13. Therefore, it must be possible to make c the unique winner
by adding only candidates from D.
Otherwise if zA ≥ ωV , I /∈ plurality-ACC . As z
∗ ≥ z
A
1+ǫ ≥ |D| + 1,
z∗ > |D|, that is, there must be some candidates outside of D used in the
optimal solution to I ′, so I /∈ plurality-ACC since there is no subset of D
that will make c a winner, by Lemma 8.1.11.
Since FW and A can determine whether I is in plurality-ACC or not
in polynomial time and plurality-ACC is NP-hard, A cannot exist, that is,
plurality-ACCW /∈ APX.
Since we can use unweighted voters in the previous set of proofs equiva-
lently by adding one identical voter for each unit of weight in the construc-
tion (as in Corollary 8.1.8), the following is immediate:
Corollary 8.1.14. plurality-ACC , the optimization problem for construc-
tively controlling a plurality election by adding unweighted voters, is not
approximable (not in APX), assuming P 6= NP.
8.2 Deleting Candidates
We can define the respective optimization problems for both destructive
and constructive control by deleting candidates under the plurality voting
scheme. When examining the unweighted cases of these problems, they are
clearly not number problems (for the same reason as in Lemma 8.1.1) and
thus not in FPTAS (as in Lemma 8.1.2).
However, it appears that we are not able to use the same technique as
in the proofs of Theorems 8.1.3 and 8.1.9. This is so because the related
decision problems (plurality-ACD and plurality-ACC) have no bounds be-
sides the spoiler candidates used to perform the control must be a subset
of a given set. In a sense, the candidate-adding problems are unbounded,
whereas problems regarding candidate deletion are bounded : there is some
k and the number of candidates deleted must not exceed it.
The immediate problem awaiting one who attempts to write a proof of
nonapproximability of the optimization problems for deleting candidates is
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that, while it is reasonably easy to tell if some candidates outside of those in
the original instance (i.e., those added when constructing the new instance)
are used in the approximate solution, it is difficult to tell whether more than
k of the candidates in the original instance were used to find the approximate
solution.
When the decision problems are unbounded (such as in control by adding
candidates), we simply scale the weights of the preexisting voters to give
significantly more weight to the preexisting candidates than to our additional
candidates, and we can do this because we do not care how many of the
preexisting candidates have to be added. However, in bounded cases such
as candidate deletion, since each preexisting candidate is scaled the same
way using similar techniques as before, it is not possible (or, at least, not
as simple) to determine how many of such candidates were used in the
approximate solution.
8.3 Partitioning
As with the other problems, the partitioning control problems, including
partitioning candidates and voters and the variations within these, have
associated optimization problems. These are less obvious than the others,
but they are natural. We will define an optimum partition to be one in
which the size of the largest half resulting from the partition is minimized.
As with all of the other control problems, these are not number problems
and are not in FPTAS as long as their respective decision problems are NP-
hard. For plurality, this means that any partition of candidates optimization
will not be in FPTAS and partition of voters with ties promoting is also not
in FPTAS.
As we can see in Table 3.1, control by partition is often NP-hard in
the plurality system and is sometimes the same in approval and Condorcet
when partitioning the voters. Proving that control by partition is not ap-
proximable is difficult, and the techniques from the previous proofs are of
little use here. The biggest difficulty encountered while trying to apply such
techniques to these problems is that it is much more difficult to modify the
election in a controlled way with partitioning. Also, controlling how the
partitions happen (and ensuring that bad partitions are noticed) is prob-
lematic.
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Plurality Condorcet Approval
Control by Construct. Destruct. Construct. Destruct. Construct. Destruct.
Adding Candidates SR SR I V I V
Deleting Candidates WR WR V I V I
Partition TE: WR TE: WR V I TE: V TE: I
of Candidates TP: WR TP: WR TP: I TP: I
Run-off Partition TE: WR TE: WR V I TE: V TE: I
of Candidates TP: WR TP: WR TP: I TP: I
Adding Voters V V WR V WR V
Deleting Voters V V WR V WR V
Partition TE: V TE: V WR V TE: WR TE: V
of Voters TP: WR TP: WR TP: WR TP: V
Table 8.1: Summary of results regarding the approximability of control problems
for plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting schemes, with unweighted voters as
presented in this chapter. I = immune, WR = weakly resistant (not in FPTAS),
SR = strongly resistant (not in APX), V = vulnerable, TE = Ties-Eliminate, TP
= Ties-Promote. Vulnerability and immunity results follow directly from [5, 21].
8.4 Adding and Deleting Voters
For plurality, neither of these problems are difficult, but are rather both
in P.
However, these are difficult for approval and Condorcet voting in the con-
structive cases, and if their unbounded versions were also NP-hard it would
be possible to show that these are not approximable, by using techniques
such as is used in the proofs for control by adding candidate in plurality
(Section 8.1). Since both addition and deletion are easy in approval and
Condorcet in the unbounded case (where as many candidates as liked may
be added or deleted), such a proof will not work, for reasons similar to those
given in Section 8.2.
Since none of these problems are number problems, none of them will be
in FPTAS, whether or not voter weights are allowed to vary.
8.5 Summary
To get a better idea of the texture of the approximability of control prob-
lems, let us construct tables similar to Table 3.1 (which enumerates the
complexities of each constructive and destructive case for control problems)
in Section 3.2.2. The results are Table 8.1 and 8.2, which contain the tight-
est known bounds regarding the approximability of the control problems, in
their unweighted and weighted versions, respectively.
We have included one table each for the unweighted and weighted ver-
sions of these problems because it is unclear whether they will be identical.
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Plurality Condorcet Approval
Control by Construct. Destruct. Construct. Destruct. Construct. Destruct.
Adding Candidates SR SR I V I V
Deleting Candidates WR WR V I V I
Partition TE: WR TE: WR V I TE: V TE: I
of Candidates TP: WR TP: WR TP: I TP: I
Run-off Partition TE: WR TE: WR V I TE: V TE: I
of Candidates TP: WR TP: WR TP: I TP: I
Adding Voters V V WR V WR V
Deleting Voters V V WR V WR V
Partition TE: V TE: V WR V TE: WR TE: V
of Voters TP: WR TP: WR TP: WR TP: V
Table 8.2: Summary of results regarding the approximability of control problems
for plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting schemes, with weighted voters as
presented in this chapter. I = immune, WR = weakly resistant (not in FPTAS),
SR = strongly resistant (not in APX), V = vulnerable, TE = Ties-Eliminate, TP
= Ties-Promote. Vulnerability and immunity results follow directly from [5, 21].
If the unweighted version of a problem is strongly resistant, then the more
general weighted version must also be strongly resistant. If there exists an
approximation algorithm for a weighted control problem, it must also per-
form an approximation when all of the voters’ weights are unit weights, that
is, in the unweighted case. The same argument can be made regarding weak
resistance.
However, we cannot necessarily always transplant approximability resis-
tance results from a weighted control problem to the unweighted problem.
We have seen in Corollaries 8.1.8 and 8.1.14 that sometimes nonapproxima-
bility of an unweighted problem can be inferred from the nonapproximability
of the equivalent weighted problem.
In the cited instances, the relationship is easy to see because if there
existed an approximation algorithm for the unweighted problem, an instance
of the weighted problem could be approximated by making it unweighted
(adding, say ω identical voters for a voter with ω weight, though we must be
careful to avoid exponential weights—in these cases, the weights in question
are dependent only on ǫ, not the length of the instance) and using the
unweighted approximation algorithm.
But when we look at performing such a reduction for voter addition,
deletion, or partition, the ω voters in the unweighted instance corresponding
to one weighted voter might not be controlled in the same manner, thus
vastly changing the mechanics of the problem. It is possible, and perhaps
likely, that there exist reductions for these voter-control problems from the
weighted to the unweighted cases, say, by cleverly adding candidates in
such a way that the full set of unweighted voters must be all controlled
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the same way. These reductions look to be as involved as those proving
nonapproximability.
To be clear: it may be the case that some unweighted control problems
(specifically, voter-control problems) are approximable (but not in PO) even
if their corresponding weighted problems are not approximable.
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